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INTRODUCTION 
SYNOPSIS: Introduction. I. Administrative Control: A) Organic administrative 
control (1. external organic control, 2. internal organic control), B) Functional 
administrative control (1. popularis actio, 2. remedies), II. Judicial Review: A) 
Financial Jurisdiction of the Administrative High Court, B) Financial Jurisdiction 
of the ordinary Courts of Justice (1. financial criminal jurisdiction, 2. financial 
civil jurisdiction), III. Constitutional Control of Financial Law.1 
1 Works of reference cited below are as follows: Adamovich, L.: Handbuch 
des österreichischen Verfassungsrechts. Wien.5 (Hgg. v. H. Spanner), 1957. Beck S.: 
Államigazgatás és igazságszolgáltatás (Administration and jurisdiction). (13 Üj 
évf. Jogtudományi Közlöny, No. 1—2) Budapest, 1958. Beér J.: Az államigazgatási 
aktusok bírói felülvizsgálatának államjogi és államigazgatási-jogi problémái 
(Problems of public and administrative laws of Judicial Review). (13. Űj évf. 
Jogtudományi Közlöny, No. 1—2.). Budapest, 1958. Carrow, N. M.: Types of Judicial 
Relief from Administrative Action. (58 Columbia Law Review, No. 1.). New York, 
1958. Dicey, A. V.: Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution. 
Oxford, 1885 (Hungarian transl. by J. Tarnai: Bevezetés az angol alkotmányjogba. 
Budapest, 1902). Eötvös J.: A XIX. század uralkodó eszméinek befolyása az 
álladalomra (Influence of leading ideas of the 19:th century to the State), 1854. 
(összes munkái, XIII,—XIV. köt. Budapest,4 1902). Ferrero, G.: Reconstruction. 
Talleyrand ä Vienne (1814—15). Paris, 1940., Pouvoir. Les Génies invisibles de la 
Cité. New York, 1942. Mrs. J. Ferróné: Az államigazgatási határozatok megtámadása 
a bíróság előtt (Judicial Review of Administrative Actions). (4 Magyar Jog, No. 6). 
Budapest, 1957. Jaffe, L. L.: The Right to Judicial Review. (71 Harvard Law 
Review, No. 5). Cambridge, Mass., 1958. Jaffe-Henderson: Judicial Review and the 
Rule of Law: Historical Origins (72 Law Quarterly Review). London, 1956. Kiss E.: 
A vállalati belső ellenőrzésről (Internal Control of Enterprises). (2 Pénzügy és 
Számvitel, No. 10). Budapest, 1958. Korbuly I.: Magyarország közjoga, illetve a 
magyar államjog rendszere (Constitutional Law of Hungary, resp. a System of 
Hungarian State Law), 1871. Budapest,4 1884. Langrod, G.: Contrőle judiciaire de 
1'Administration américaine. (1 Annales Universitatis Saraviensis, Droit-Économie, 
No. 2.) Saarbrücken, 1952; The French Council of State: Its Role in the Formulation 
and Implementation of Administrative Law (49 The American Political Science 
Review). Menasha, Wise., 1955. Letourneur, M.—Hamson, C.—J.: The Control of 
Discretionary Executive Power in France (11 The Cambridge Law Journal, No. 2). 
London 1952. Mártonffy K.: A közigazgatási bíróság reformja (Reform, of the 
Administrative High Court). (Jogászégyleti Szemle, No. 2). Budapest, 1947. Martonyi 
J.: Az adókivetési és beszedési eljárás új szabályozása (A new regulation of 
proceedings of imposing and collecting taxes). (2 Pénzügy és Számvitel, No. 2). Buda-, 
pest, 1958; A lakosságadóztatási eljárás szabályozása (Regulation of imposing taxes 
immediately on the population). (Acta Universitatis Szegediensis, Pol. & Jur. Tom. 
III, Fasc. 2). Szeged, 1958. Marx—Engels: Selected letters (in Hung. Budapest, Szikra, 
1950). Melichar, E.: öffentlicher Haushalt und Finanzsystem Österreichs. Handbuch 
der Finanzwissenschaft, Bd. III).2 1956. Mommsen, Th.: Römisches Staatsrecht. Leip-
zig,3 1887—8. Bd. I—III. Montesquieu: Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur 
des Romains et de leur décadence, 1734. (Oeuvres compl.). Paris, 1838. Névai L.: Az 
államigazgatási per néhány alapkérdése (Some fundamental problems of the 
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The legal structure is one of the most effective uniting forces of Society, 
G. Ferrero2 wrote of these forces that they were like silk threads keeping 
together the World with imperceptible bonds. But if these threads break they 
can be substituted only with chains of iron. To make this invisible and behind 
the scenes of History silently working structure lasting and effective: we 
need some guarantees. What is the value of light which- is bidden or that 
of law which is unlawful? The danger of summum ius summa iniuria is 
an eternal problem both for legislators and practicians of law. 
Montesquieu3 mentioned the problem of the unlawful law among the 
causes of the decline of the Roman World Empire »11 n'y a point de plus 
cruelle tyrannie — he wrote — que celle que l'on exerce à l'ombre des lois, 
et avec les couleurs de la justice, lorsqu'on va pour ainsi dire noyer des 
malheureux sur la planche même sur laquelle ils s'étaient sauvés.« This 
central problem of control later engaged also the attention of the liberal 
theory of state. »As an idea the State does not differ from the collectivity of 
its members — wrote Joseph Eötvös4 — and state interests are the same as 
those of individuals. The State Will has to be directed always to the benefit 
of the collectivity. So — from a purely idealistic point of view — in a State 
where everybody has an influence on State Government there is any safeguard 
superfluous for the individual against state power. But from a practical 
point of view things are not like this . . 
The true importance of control developed, however, not in the liberal 
but in the socialist state law. The liberal State presents but a faint silhouette 
of the concentration of force realized in the socialist State by uniting the 
power in the way of the democratic centralism. But the democracy of this 
centralism must be safeguarded to make this immense machine — not only 
impossible but also inimaginable in the Past — function well. Thus the 
significance of control has remained untouched and even grown in socialist 
States but the point of view of socialist jurists differs essentially from that 
of their liberal colleagues. In the liberal State this question is discussed, in 
principle, from the point of view of fundamental human rights. »As the 
exercise of power is to be transferred to the individuals or to the majority 
— wrote Eötvös in the above mentioned work — and as the legislative 
power and Government starting from the people itself the State Will is 
administrative lawsuit). (13 Űj évf. Jogtudományi Közlöny, No. 1—2). Budapest, 
1958. Peck, C. J.: The Scope of Judicial Review of Administrative Action in 
Washington. (33 Washington Law Review and State Bar Journal, No. 1). Seattle, 
Wash., 1958. Russell, B.: Authority and the Individual. London, 1949. Ruck, E.: 
Schweizerisches Staatsrecht. Zürich.3 1957. Schaumann, W.: Verordnungsrecht und 
parlamentarische Kontrolle im Kanton Zürich (179 Neue Zürcher Zeitung und 
Schweizerisches Handelsblatt, Femausgabe Nr. 311). Zürich, 1958. Szabó J.: Demok-
rácia és közjogi bíráskodás (Democracy and jurisdiction of public law). Budapest, 
1946; A közigazgatási bíróság reformja (Reform of the Administrative High 
Court). (Jogászegyleti Szemle, No. 2.). Budapest, 1947. Tomcsányi M.: Magyar köz-
igazgatási és pénzügyi jog (Hungarian administrative and financial law.) Különös 
(Szakigazgatási) Rész. Budapest, 1933. Török L.: Törvény az állami ellenőrzés új 
rendszeréről (Ac't on the the new System of State Supervision. (13 Új évf. Jogtudo-
mányi Közlöny, No. 6). Budapest, 1958. 
2 Ferrero: Reconstruction, 326, Pouvoir, 145. 
3 Montesquieu 159. 
4 Eötvös III, 211. 
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always the will of majority: It follows that the freedom of the individual 
always needs some guarantees against the unrestrained power of State, 
however it may be arranged; and the degree of personal freedom, enjoyed 
by the individual in a State, depends especially upon the existence and value 
of such guarantees.« 
The Socialist State, however, regards the problem from the higher point 
of view of the community. The control is required not only by the security 
of individuals but also by the efficiency of State order. Without a control 
a socialist State could function not only not freely but not at all. This was 
seen very well by Lenin5 when he wrote as follows: »To control men and to 
control the real execution of affairs — this is now, once again and exclusively, 
the turning-point of our whole work, our whole policy.« To realize the true 
significance of this theorem of Lenin the legal theory of this country needed 
some time. John Beér6 writes about this: »In the beginning, we had had, as 
yet, no good grasp of the importance of the legality of administrative activity 
in socialist relations. We had expected too rapid results from other forms of 
social and state control in the field of safeguarding the socialist legality of 
administrative work.« 
To-day, 'however, nobody more challenges the importance of socialist 
legality in the legal theory of this country. In the Hungarian financial law, 
e. g., there function at present three separate systems of control side by side: 
An administrative, a judicial and a constitutional control. 
Certainly, it is a moot point whether the system of judicial procedure 
and that of legal remedies — including, in a wider sense, also the procedures 
of complaint and those of notification — may be inserted in this system of 
•control. A second question is whether we should confront — instead of the 
above mentioned triple division — the control conducted ex officio with that 
held on initiative of citizens. This treatise does persist, all the same, in 
the grouping mentioned above because it considers the difference of branches 
of state powers more characteristic for the way of control than the 
participation of citizens in, or their absense from, this control. Maybe, the 
primary purpose of judicial procedure is not controlling; its effect, however, 
has doubtless also a controlling character. It establishes and enforces not 
only subjective rights and duties but it also guarantees the due process of 
administrative organization and, in the last resort, that of the whole legal 
order. And the control character of legal remedies can be found in 
calling attention of organs with jurisdiction to intervene. They render 
possible with this to exercise a control. The control is, therefore, not in 
resorting to a legal remedy but in passing a decision by reason of it. There 
is the authority which exercises the control; and the role of the individual 
in control is, in any way, a secondary one. It is, therefore, correct to start 
from the division of objective spheres of action and not from that of official 
and individual functions. 
5 Lenin, I. V.: Sotch. (Works, Russian), XXVIII, 129. 
6 Beer 35. B. Russell 88 has written: »A healthy and progressive society 
requires both central control and individual and 'group initiative: without control 
there is anarchy, and without initiative there is stagnation.« 
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I. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL 
The administrative control is either organic or functional.. The former 
assures a control by organizing the machinery of. financial law; the latter by 
increasing the guarantees of financial proceedings. The two administrative 
control systems subsist side by side and complete each other. 
A) Organic Administrative Control 
The organic conVroI has two forms: An external and an internal one. 
The lormer makes an organ supervised by another one which is exterior 
— co-ordinated or superior — to the controlled organ, having either exclusively 
a control authority or also other functions; this control may be exercised by 
decentralised or centralised organs. The .latter form of control creates internal 
special organs for controlling itself. It is obvious that the former method is 
more practicable, no organ being suitable for controlling itself. Also the 
notion and purpose of control requires more an external than an internal 
organ. We prefer, therefore, to develop more the former kind of control — 
although some have disagreed with this view.6a 
1. External Organic Control 
1. 
The decentralized organs of external organic control, in this country, 
were for a long time the audit ojjices. Their creation was ordered by the Act 
on the Court of Accounts,7 but it was drawn out by the Governments, seemingly 
being not very enthusiastic about being controlled, just as there was impeded 
for a long time also the creation of the Administrative High Court, set up 
with a mutilated organization at last. The audit offices were created by 
Act No. 1897 :XX on audit of public moneys, after nearly two decades. The Act 
established audit offices beside the Cabinet Ministers8 and public authorities 
entrusted with managing state property and revenues or invested w i t h l h e 
right of remittance.9 These offices were decentralized and stood nevertheless 
out of the framework of the supervised authorities, being subordinated to 
the Ministry or to the administering authority only concerning the auxiliary 
administrative service. They functioned, as regards the supervision of the 
preliminary and subsequent accountancies, independently and were responsible 
for these only to the Minister himself.10 
The accountancy functions of the Capital were performed by the Capital's 
Accountancy Department under a chief auditor's guidance; its cashier's service 
6a Cf.: Kiss 371. 
7 Art. 27 of Act No. 1870:XVIII. 
8 The Prime Minister's audit office was later liquidated by Act No. 1908 :LL 
9 Art. 85 of Act No. 1897:XX. 
Art. 87 of Act No. 1897 :XX. 
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was managed by the pay-office headed by a cashiers's director,. both being 
subordinated to the Mayor.11 These Capital offices were supervised by the 
Capital's Court Accounts12 headed by a director subordinated immediately and' 
exclusively to the Chief Burgomaster. These organs of the Capital, however,, 
were liquidated by a decree,13 having binding force of law, decreeing on 
the Central State Control. 
The county accountancy was exercised, in the beginning, by county civil 
servants, assuring, of course, no external control. Later, therefore, the county" 
and district accountancy was discharged by audit offices co-ordinated to the-
county financial directorates, resp. by district comptrollers delegated by 
those.14 After World War I the county accountancy was carried out by 
county audit offices subordinated to the Minister of the Interior.15 The 
independency of all audit offices increased as later they remained subordinated' 
to the competent Ministries, resp. authorities only as regards the auxiliary 
administrative service, in other respects becoming subordinated to the Ministry 
of Finance.16 
The members of audit offices were rendered independent of the influence* 
of the supervised .authorities by precautions like to guarantees of judicial 
independence. So the head of the ministerial audit office was subordinated, 
as to his personal affairs, to the Minister immediately. The civil servants' 
in audit offices were responsible for the accountancy service to the head, 
of the audit office, resp. to the Minister.17 The other audit offices were.-
headed by Chiefs. This presented proposals, as to personal affairs of the 
civil servants under his guidance, to the authority supervised by this office:. 
The authority was, however, not authorized to decide in these affairs but 
it had to submit these, with a report, through the head of the ministerial 
audit office, to the Minister. In the affairs of the heads of audit offices the head 
of the ministerial audit office independently made his propositions to the Mi-
nister.18 Later the Minister of Finance decided in personal affairs of each 
audit office servant.19 At the Capital Court of Accounts also the incompetency 
in consequence of relation or profession was regulated.20 The members of 
audit officer enjoyed special guarantees also on the field of disciplinary 
procedure. This was all the more important because the disciplinary law" 
of Hungarian civil servants, with few exceptions, was excluded from the-
authority of ordinary and administrative Courts equally and was never-
regulated satisfactorily. Also the members of audit offices enjoyed no judicial 
protection but they had more guarantees than the most other civil servants. 
Thus the departmental investigation could be prescribed against the head 
11 Art. 51/1—2. of Act No. 1930:XVIII. 
1 2 Art. 51/3—6 of Act No. 1930:XVIII.: »Székesfővárosi Számszék.« 
1 3 Art. 24 of Decree of legal force No. 17/1949. 
1 4 Art. 1—2 of Act No. 1902:111. 
15 Art. 20, 27 of Departmental order of the Minister of Interior, No.. 
160 224/1924. BM; Art. 1—4 of Departmental order of the Minister of Interior No. 
76 000/1929. BM. 
16 Art. 1—2 of Act No. 1920:XXVIII. 
17 Art. 88—9 of Act No. 1897 :XX. 
18 Art. 90 of Act No. 1897 :XX. 
1 9 Art. 3 of Act No. 1920:XXVLII. 
20 Art. 63/1—8 of Act No. 1930:XVIII. 
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•Of an audit office only by the Minister, against the civil servants of this office 
by the head of the office or by the Minister. Their disciplinary authories 
were in the cases of members of the ministerial audit offices the disciplinary 
committee of the Ministry, in the cases of members of the other audit offices 
the supervised administrative authority, resp. the disciplinary committee 
of the county administrative council,, and in second and last instance the 
Minister.21 After having been subordinated to the Minister of Finance their 
-disciplinary forums became the disciplinary committee within this Ministry, 
and in second instance the Minister of Finance, two members, however, 
were delegated to the committee also by the competent Minister.22 For the 
head of the Capital's Court of Accounts and his deputy the general disciplinary 
rules were in force with the difference that a disciplinary action against them 
and their suspension could ve prescribed only by the Minister of the Interior 
and their disciplinary forum was in the first and last instance the Disciplinary 
Court.23 This privilege was extended later to their whole staff.24 
There fell within the competence of the audit offices the reporting, the 
auxiliary administrative service (legalization before assignation, auditing, 
compilation of registrations), checking of accounts before paying, book-keeping 
;and examination of public accounts.25 The authority was obliged to make 
them acquainted with the' data necessary for performing their tasks. Before 
countersigning the assignments they looked after whether the expenses 
had a cover granted in the budget; whether they were not assigned repeatedly; 
whether their amounts filled the requirements of legal rules and prescriptions.26 
If the assignment was irregular, it contained expenses without provision or 
additional ones, the audit office had to call the attention of the Minister or 
that of the head of the administrative authority to this anomaly. If this 
insisted, nevertheless, on assigning, in the beginning it was a rule that the 
head of the audit office had to countersign also this asignment, with a 
remark, anyhow, »by order«.27 Later the competent Minister was obliged to 
turn in such a case to the Minister of Finance for appropriate action.28 
The audit examined legality and authenticity of items equally.29 So it was 
not purely formal but concerned also the merits of cases. The observations, 
made in the cause of the revision of accounts, were asserted against the 
-civil servants who managed properties in the course of a so-called accounta-
bility action. The condemning or discharging order was issued by the head 
of the audit office. An appeal could be lodged to the Minister and from him one 
could plead to the ordinary Court of Justice, in forty-five days.30 
. 21 Art. 81—92 of Act No. 1897 :XX. 
22 Art. 4 of Act No. i920:XXVIII. 
23 Art. 87/3 of Act No. 1929 :XXX; Art. 67 of Act No. 1930:XVIII. 
24 Art. 17 of Act No. 1934:XII; Departmental orders of the Minister of the Interior 
JNos. 106.600/1936. BM; 106.601/1936. BM; 33.800/1939.. BM. 
25 Art. 5 of Act No. 1897:XX. 
26 Art. 96—97 of Act No. 1897:XX. 
27 Art. 98 of Act No. 1897 :XX. 
28 Art.8 of Act 1920:XXVIII. 
29 Art. 104 of Act No. 1897:XX. 
30 Art, 127—141 of Act No. 1897:XX. 
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In the beginning our new law extended the field of function of audit 
•offices. New audit offices were organized also besides the Prime Minister, 
the Supreme Economic Council and the Central Planning Board.31 Also the 
decree reorganizing the audit offices, the whole national economy, and public 
accountancy maintained them,32 and even prohibited — for keeping up the 
independent organization of audit offices and making their control activity 
more successful — to assign the sections, groups or members of audit offices 
to ministerial sections, resp. to auxiliary administrative audit services or to 
oblige them to perform administrative functions, save with an exceptional 
order of the Minister after being proposed by the head of the audit office.33 
A later decree,34 however, liquidated the audit offices. From this time on 
the task of organic administrative control has been taken over partly by 
• central external organs, partly by new internal organs of the supervised 
authorities created for this purpose. 
2. 
The centralized organization of State supervision was not unknown even 
in the old Hungarian law. The stress, however, was on the decentralized organs 
held more effective. Central organs were, e. g., the general control organs in 
the framework of the Ministry of Finance like the Supervisory Authority of 
Private Insurance Companies,315 the Supervisory Authority of Public 
Concerns,36 or the Superintendence of Sheltered Estates.37 These were organs 
of national competence but of a specialized sphere of action. The new control 
; system had begun, before liquidating the audit offices, to create national 
control organs of general sphere of action, abolishing step by step the ancient 
• organs. 
An order organized the Records Office of Audits of Public Interest,28 
for centralized administration of data of audits concerning the inner management 
of enterprises. It stood under general supervision of the Prime Minister 
exercised through the Secretary General of the Supreme Economic Council. 
[From this supervision there were, however, exempted — beside police and judicial 
inquiries — the most part of the examination material of the financial author-
ities, of the Hungarian National Bank, of the Central Corporation of Banking 
Companies, and of the Central Planning Board. The Records Office waá 
created in the framework of the Central Corporation of Banking Companies, 
i. e. more for an economic, banking control than for a legal supervision. Its 
•head and staff were appointed from the number of the employees of the 
Central Corporation, and dismissed, by the Sectretary General of the Supreme 
31 Order in Council No. 4048/1949. Koran. 
32 Order in Council No. 13.000/1948. Korm. 
33 Art. 12 of Order in Council No. 13.000/1948, Korm. 
34 Decree of legal force No. 2/1950. tvr. 
35 Art. 1—2 of Act No. 1923 :VIII. 
36 Order in Council No. 4600/1933. ME. 
37 Order in Council No. 4150/1934. ME. 
38 Order in Council No. 1620/1948. Korm., Enacting order . No. 282/1948. GF: 
-»Közérdekű Vizsgálatok Nyilvántartója.« 
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Economic Council. Its procedure was confidential. Only persons exceptionally 
authorized could look into the informations. and even they could not be 
acquainted with the names of the informers.39 Its standing committee could 
transfer the administration of urgent cases to a Committee of Three consisting; 
of the delegates of the Supreme Court of Accounts, of the Minister, of Finance, 
and of the Secretary General of the Supreme Economic Council, with 
engagement of subsequent reporting. 
Further orders40 transferred the national supervision to the Minister of 
Finance. He had to enact these measures by means of the Records Office 
reorganized and denominated henceforward as National Control Centre 
It was taken out of the organization of the Central Corporation of Banking 
Companies and its expenses were appropriated in the Prime Minister's budget 
under the side of expenses of the Supreme Economic Council. Later its 
competence became more ample containing also regular supervision of state 
enterprises and of those of national interest.42 It made investigations also in. 
affairs connected with the execution of the Plan Act, in price problems, in 
reparation affairs and in those of foreign trade, in conformity with instructions 
of the departmental Ministers, resp. of the authorities. It held a general 
inquiry at every enterprise at least once a year, reporting to the competent 
Minister, to the Minister of Finance, to the Secretary General of the Supreme 
Economic Council, and to the Central Plannig Board. If it did not agree with, 
the interested authorities in some dispositions, then the affair was submitted 
to the Supreme Economic Council which used to inspect the plans and accounts 
of enterprises. 
This control, conformed particularly to enterprises, was generalized by a-
further decree which reorganized its authority, denominated it National-
Supervisory Centre,*3 and liquidated, at the same time, the main control 
organs of the remote and recent Past: The Supreme Court of Accounts, the-
National Control Centre, and the Court of Accounts of the Capital.44 Its 
supervision extended over the organs of state administration, including also 
the local organs of state power, over the state enterprises, and over some-
corporations and institutes of general interest. Not even the military organs, the 
Courts and public prosecutors were exempted — outside the range of judicature, 
resp. prosecution. The supervision could be extended also over private enter-
prises. Its purpose was generally to explore how the public institutions 
executed ' the orders of higher organs and how their management fulfilled 
the Plan. The Centre functioned under general supervision of the Council 
of Ministers exercised through the People's Economic Council. Its president, 
and his deputies were appointed by the Presidium of the People's Republic 
on proposition of the President of the People's Economic Council with 
approval of the Council of Ministers. Its other employees were nominated 
by the President. Also their professional incompatibility was regulated. Its: 
39 Art. 4 of Enacting order No. 282/1948. GF. 
40 Orders in Council Nos. 4870/1948. Korm., 7660/1948. Korm. 
4 1 »Állami Ellenőrzési Központ.« 
4 2 Order in Council No. 7410/1948. Korm. 
43 Decree of legal force No. 17/1949. tvr., Enacting instruction No. 393/1949-
Mt. h.: »Állami Ellenőrző Központ.« 
44 Art. 7 of Decree of legal force No. 17/1949. tvr. 
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ordinary supervision extended to the whole functioning of the supervised 
organ, and its extraordinary supervision to some affairs or groups of affairs. 
It could not make arrangements immediately but it had to call the attention 
of the head of the supervised organ and that of the competent Minister to 
the troubles, and if these did not take measures, that of the People's Economic 
Council, and in the case of non-economic departments that of the Council of 
Ministers. 
Act No. 1952:11 reorganized the Centre again and placed it under 
immediate supervision of the Council of Ministers. Some affairs45 were 
exempted from its control. Hereafter its President was appointed by the 
Presidium of the People's Republic on proposition of the Council of Ministers, 
and his deputies by the Council of Ministers. To significant enterprises, 
constructions, railways it could set out local accountants or supervisory groups. 
It had to make proposals to the Council ~ of Ministers for putting end to the 
troubles. And it could oblige persons causing damages to pay a compensation.46 
Later the Centre was reorganized again by a further decree under the new 
name of a Ministry of State Control.*1 Its task was to take part with its 
supervisory activity in building the socialism, in raising the population's 
prosperity and their cultural supply, to control execution of the most 
seasonable tasks prescribed by the policy of Party and Government, to 
struggle for eliminating the faults, for a more effective protection of the 
social property, and against wastage, bureaucratism, and lack of discipline. 
It is evident that its tasks were principally not of legal but of economic 
nature: Control of efficacy of producing equipments, that of execution 
of legal orders to use the financial means and labour according to the Plan, 
to raise productivity, to introduce progressive technical and agricultural 
procedures and to ameliorate the quality of industrial products at the 
Ministries and other national organs, at the specialized administrative organs 
of the Council Executive Committees and at other national, co-operative and 
social organs and enterprises. It had also to control the protection of social 
property, registration of using up material and financial means, enforcing 
thrift in economy. It could give instructions to the head of the supervised 
organ, impose disciplinary punishment for 'irregularities and oblige to pay 
damages.48 He placed out also local accountants. 
The Ministry of State Control was also liquidated by a decree.49 Its 
competence, however, was shortly transferred to a recent institution: the 
People's Control.50 A Central People's Control Commission51 has been created 
under immediate Government supervision and subordinated to this Commission 
territorial (Capital, county, district, town, etc.) people's control commission^ 
and bureaux. These are hierarchically subordinated to each other and perform 
45 Foreign Affairs, Affairs of the People's Army, State Security Authority, 
mass organizations. 
46 Order in Council No. 51/1952. MT. 
« Decree of legal force No. 28/1955. tvr.: »Állami Ellenőrzés Minisztériuma.« 
48 Order in Council No. 48/1955. MT. 
49 Art. 1 of Decree of legal force No. 33/1956. tvr. 
5 0 Act No. 1957:VII; Enacting order No. 6/1958. Koran. Cf. Decree of U. S. S. R. 
No. 474/1957. (VIII. 23): Török 233. 
51 »Központi Népi Ellenőrzési Bizottság.« _ .. . . . . . -
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their functions with the help of the working people. They draw into their 
work also people's controllers. Their budget is appropriated under head of the 
Council of Ministers as an independent chapter. Their task is to consolidate-
the civil discipline, to protect people's property, to reveal corrupt practices, to 
struggle for detecting the hostile, corrupt and bureaucratic persons, to take 
part in reinforcing the people's democratic State. Their supervision can be 
complex (inquiry of a branch of the people's economy or of an important 
question on national level), general (extending to the whole functioning of an 
enterprise, institute, craftsman, etc.) or target control (inquiry of a definite 
personal behaviour or default). President and members of the Central People's 
Control Commission are appointed and recalled by the Presidium of the 
People's Republic, those of the territorial Commissions by the local Councils. 
To recalling of local Commission members also the approval of the Central 
People's Control Commission is indispensable. The territorial People's Control 
Commissions are supervised by the Central one and the latter by the 
Government. In urgent cases the Presidents take measures but they render 
account to their Commissions subsequently. The Central People's Control 
Committee may supervise every administrative organ, enterprise, association,, 
co-operative, craftsman and merchant, save armed corporations, Courts and 
public prosecutors. Functioning of the territorial Commissions does not 
extend to procedure of Ministries and to that of organs of national compet-
ence and to proper activity of offices or enterprises under their leading. 
Also incompatibility of the Commission members has been regulated. They 
are not authorized to instruct the supervised organ but they may make 
propositions and summon its leader to redress irregularities. If he fails to 
take measures the Central People's Control Commission pleads to the 
competent Minister or to the Government for calling him to account. The 
Commission members enjoy special protection by police, criminal and 
labour law. The right of notice against them is restricted. 
3. 
The central supervising organization, functioning under several names, 
cannot substitute, however, alone the liquidated decentralized, organs of 
control. It is, therefore, indispensable to utilize also the supervising activity 
of national organs which are created not exclusively and even not primarily 
for control purposes. The Act organizing the people's control52 provides 
expressively about this determining the relation of the organization of 
people's control with other state organs entitled to supervise. According to 
this Act the activity of people's control does not exempt the state, co-
operative and social organisations from control duties prescribed for them. 
Such a central organ is, first of all, the Presidium of the People's 
Republic.53 This can exercise, in transferred competence, nearly the whole 
power of the legislative body when this is not in session.54 And it has, in 
addition to this, also in own sphere of authority a wide possibility to exercise 
5 2 Art. 18—19 of Act No. 1957:VII. 
5 3 »Népköztársaság Elnöki Tanácsa« = NET. 
54 Art. 20/4 of Act No. 1949 :XX. 
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supervision. Thus its control power can be exercised, concerning financial-
law, by ratification of international treaties of economic content; by. 
nullification, amendment or reversal of legal rules, decisions or dispositions-
of organs of administration or of the local organs of state power if these 
commit offence against the Constitution or interfere with interests of the 
working people; at last by dissolving the local organs of the state power 
for the same reasons.55 
Another organ, exercising also supervision, is the supreme organ o f 
administration, the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic.™ 
This directs the work of Ministries and other organs subordinated to it: 
immediately, and assures execution of laws, of decrees of Presidium having; 
the binding force of law, and of plans of people's economy.57 The 
Government may take measures not only immediately or by a member of . 
its but it is authorized by the Constitution of the People's Republic58 to-
place under its own supervision each branch of administration and to 
create special organs for this purpose which will not be subordinated to 
a departmental Ministry and can be used also for control. A number of" 
these organs were of transitory character but some of them have continued 
in existence. 
As such an organ was established the National Economic Council,59' 
composed of delegates of democratic parties and economic organizations. 
A. governmental organ even more significant was the Supreme Economic 
Council.60 The Government transferred to this, for a time, its activity for 
assuring the normal course of economic life. Its President was the Prime 
Minister, its members were the Ministers of Industry and of Transport and. 
later also the Ministers of Finance and of Food. Its secretariat was headed 
by a Secretary General appointed by the Council of Ministers. Its expenses; 
were parts of the budget of Prime Minister. Besides its preparatory function 
it immediately made provisions for execution of orders and other legal 
rules, issued by it. This function included a wide range of supervisory 
activites. It' was entitled to penalise trespassing of its rules like 
misdemeanours. Its Secretary General later received important competence 
in affairs of price regulation, of fulfilling orders given by public bodies, 
of settlement and even of budget.61 
Afier liquidation of the Supreme Economic Council its competence 
and that of its Secretary General were taken over by the Government,, 
competent Ministers and other central organs (People's Economic Council, 
Central Planning Board).62 Hereupon the Government provided for the-
55 Art. 20/1—3 of Act NO. 194&:XX. 
56 »Magyar Népköztársaság Kormánya.« 
57 Art. 25/1, 4 of Act No. 1949 :XX. 
58 Art. 28/2 of Act No,. 1949:XX. 
59 Orders in Council Nos. 75,1/1945. ME, 1159/1945. ME; Departmental Order-
of the Minister of Finance No. 17.060/1945. PM; »Országos Gazdasági Tanács.« 
60 Orders in Council Nos. 12.090/1945. ME, 230/1946. ME, 3650/1946. ME; 
Enacting instruction No. 6/1945. GF: »Gazdasági Főtanács«. 
61 Orders in Council Nos. 7640/1948. Korm., 9130/1948. Korm., 9410/1948. Korm., 
10.830/1948. Korm., 10.840/1948. Korm., 11.180/1948. Korm., 630/1949. Korm., Act-
No. 1949 :XV, etc. 
62 Orders in Council Nos. 4083/1949. Korm., 4148/1949. Korm. 
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planntd management of the people's economy through the People's Economic 
Council,63 having a member of Government as President. This determined, 
"beside the directives and frame-numbers of Planning, tasks of state control 
•and statistical collection of data, brought into harmony the activity of 
economic organs, and exercised control over the Central Planning Board, 
Central Bureau of Statistics, National Supervisory Centre, Labour Planning 
Office and other organs subordinated to it by the Government, Thus it 
!had also a control activity. It was under a separate head in state budget. 
Later it was liquidated and its task reverted to the Government.64 
Some other organs proved to be more permanent. Thus the Council 
of Planned Economy and the Central Planning Board65 created under 
supervision of Prime Minister to elaborate the plans of people's economy66 
and supervise their execution, with county agencies,67 headed by a President 
appointed by the Presidium of the People's Republic. Its local organs are the 
officials responsible for promoting plan-fulfilment,68 and the managers of 
state enterprises.69 Also the Central Bureau of Statistics,10 functioning 
under supervision of Government, (has a controlling sphere of action; its 
territorial organs are the county boards of statistics, district and town 
inspectorates of statistics.71 The Material and Price Office72 organized under 
.supervision of the Minister of Industry terminated soon;73 its competence 
of price regulation was taken over by the Council of Ministers, the President 
•of the Central Planning Board, the competent Ministers and the local 
•offices of price regulation.74 Later a National 'Price Office75 was organized 
under supervision of the Minister of Finance. Its supervision, however, has 
been taken over by the Government and exercised by a delegated member 
of its. Also the Council and Secretariat of contraventions,76 reorganized from 
the Council of Petty Offenses,77 functioned subordinated immediately, to 
•Government; but later it was liquidated.78 
6 3 Act No.l949:XVI; Decree of legal force No. 3/1952. . tvr.: »Népgazdasági 
Tanács«. 
64 Decree of legal force No. 20/1952. tvr. 
65 Act No. 1947:XVII; Orders in Council Nos. 8530/1947. Korm., 4279/1949. 
.MT, Decision in Council No. 1044/1958 (XII. 9) Korm. h.: »Tervgazdasági Tanács«, 
»Országos Tervhivatal.« 
66 Acts Nos. 1949 :XXV, 1951:11, 195ff:II,. 
67 Instruction No. 0.370/6/1949. OT. 
68 Orders in Council Nos. 10.520/1947. ME, 15.221/1947. ME. 
69 Art. 1/2—3 of Act No. 1948:XXXVII. 
7 0 »Központi Statisztikai Hivatal.« 
' i Acts Nos. 1929:XXX, 1952:VI. 
7 2 Ordere in Council Nos. 5740/1946. ME, 6470/1946. ME, 6890/1946. ME; 
Departmental orders of the Minister of Industry Nos. 43.000/1946. Ip. M., 3647/1946. 
Ip. M., 103.035/1947. Ip. M.: »Anyag- és Árihivatal.« 
7 3 Orders in Council Nos. 5380/1948. Korm., 5400/1948.. Korm. 
7 4 Order in Council No. 46/1955. MT. 
75. Decision in Council No. 31/1956. Korm. h„ Order in Council No. 10/1957. 
Korm.: »Országos Árhivatal.« 
76 -Art. 16 of Decree of-.legal force No.17/1955. tvr.: »Szabálysértési Tanács, 
Titkárság.« , 
77 Act No. 1929:XXX; Departmental order of the Minister of Interior No. 
:287/.1930. BM: »Kihágási Tanács.« 
7 8 Art. 8 of Act No. 1956:IV. 
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There were and are also several other central control organs. The 
financial administration had had in the time of the diçasterial system, 
before 1848, a separate central organ: The Hungarian Court Chamber,79 
founded in Ferdinand I's days. Earlier the Chief Treasurer80 had had some-
financial competence. The Chamber's independence from the Austrian 
financial chamber was assured by a number of Acts81 but with no full 
success.82 
Present central control authorities are the competent Ministers, in 
questions of financial law in particular the Minister of Finance and the 
organs subordinated to him. 
These organs exercise their control activity partly deciding over legal 
remedies, partly in the hierarchy of offices, on the way of supervision. 
According to the Act on administrative procedure83 if the superior 
administrative organ exercising its authority of supervision has set down as a 
fact that an order or disposition of a subordinated organ had trepassed on a 
legal rule, it is liable to take measures for redress of grievences. The 
financial organs generally function under superintendence of the Ministry 
of Finance but also some subordinated organs take part in supervision.81 
Ministries, organs of national competence, the Hungarian National Bank, 
central associations of co-operatives are under the control of the Minister of 
Finance. The systematic economic supervision of general directorates, 
directorates, departments of Ministries, that of offices, institutes and 
establishments under their supervision, and that of secondary organs 
functioning in enterprise form and of enterprises is exercised by organs 
directing them immediately. The Ministers send a summary report of the 
result of this systematic control to the Minister of Finance half-yearly. 
A part of central organs functioning under superintendence of the 
Minister of Finance performs banking and credit tasks. One of the oldest 
such organs was the Central Treasury,85 a great part of its functions 
devolved, however, to competence of the Postal Savings Bank and the 
Central Corporation of Banking Companies since the reorganization of 
finances after World War I (1924). Paying salaries and pensions and related 
control activity were transferred to the Central State Salary Office. 86 The 
affair of salaries became decentralized to the competent Ministries and the 
Salary Office changed its name to State Pension Office.87 Later it ceased to 
exist and a National Pension Institute was created,88 and at last this whole 
authority merged in the administration of the single social insurance pension 
7 9 Acts Nos. 1608: k. e. V., 1687 :XIV: »Magyar Udvari Kamara.: 
8 0 »Tárnokmester.« (Ancient high feudal rank in Hungary). 
»1 Acts Nos. 1609 :XXI, 1655 :XI, 1715:XVIII, 1723 :XVI, 1741:XI.V. 
8 2 Korbuly 303—4. 
S 3 Art. 63 of Act No. 1957 :IV. 
8 4 Decree of legal force No. 29/1955. tvr. 
85 1868; Royal rescript from July 20, 1874. 
86 Orders in Council Nos. 2533/1925. ME, 4000/1935. ME. 
87 Order in Council No. 60/1950. MT. 
88 Order in Council No. 190/1950. MT. 
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of the working people under supervision of the Minister of Labour.59 The 
most important organ of banking control is the Hungarian National Bank. 
After liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Bank90 there were created 
temporarily a National Bank of Issue91 and a Foreign Exchange Control 
Centre.92 Hereupon there was created the Hungarian National Bank.93 After 
World War II its General Council has been. democratized,94 and later the 
Bank has been nationalized, simultaneously with the great Banking Houses.95, 
The representation in General Assembly and the General Council were 
reorganized,96 loaning to social organs legalized.97 Subsequently several 
organs of the Bank (General Council, Executive Committee) were 
liquidated.98 A delegate of the Minister of Finance became President of 
the Board of Directors. After this the President and his deputies were 
appointed by the Presidium of the People's Republic on proposition of the 
Council of Ministers, the managing directors were nominated by the 
Council. of Ministers on proposition of the President.99 Recently the 
supervision over the Bank has reverted to the Minister of Finance again.100 
Another important organ of banking control is the Central Corporation 
of Banking Companies.101 It has been created to promote economic interests;, 
later its competence has been extended to hold revisions at enterprises 
transacting banking and exchange business, to undertake auditing on petition 
of the enterprises, to take part in arranging lotteries.102 In its framework, 
functioned also the National Economic Council.103 Here can be mentioned also 
the National Council for Credit Operations.104 This later ceased to exist and 
its competence was transferred to the Minister of Finance.105 The competence 
of the Postal Savings Bank to administer deposits was completed repeatedly;106 
it has got, after supervision by different competent Ministers under that of the 
Minister of Finance.107 After a time its savings line of business was taken 
over by the National Savings Bank, other lines of business by other organs 
(Hungarian National Bank, Central Corporation of Banking Companies) but 
89 Decrees of legal force Nos. 30/1951. tvr., 28/1954. tvr.; Order in Council No. 
1037/1957. Korm. 
Acts Nos. 1878:XXV, 1917:XVIÏI; Order in Council No. 6935/19L9. ME; Art. 
8 of Act No. 1920 :IV. 
91 Art. 8—11 of Act No. 1921:XIII: »Allami Jegyintézet.« 
92 Art. 2 of Order in Council No. 6700/1922. ME: »Devizaközpont.« 
93 Act No. 1924 :V: »Magyar Nemzeti Bank.« 
94 Orders in Council Nos. 6950/1945. ME, 11.970/1946. ME. 
95 Acts Nos. 1947 :XXX, 1948:XXXVI. 
96 Act No. 1948:XXXII; Order in Council No. 20/1948. Korm. 
97 Act No. 1948 :XLV. 
98 Decree of legal force No. 1/1949. tvr. 
99 Decision in Council No. 1084/1956. Mt. h. 
100 Decree of legal force No. 23/1956. tvr. 
101 Art. 1. of Act No. 1916:XIV; Acts Nos. 1917:IX, 1920:XXXViri, 1923:XXXII: 
»Pénzintézeti Központ.« 
I02' Art. 1 of Act No. 1926:XIII. 
1 9 3 Order in Council No. 751/1945. ME: »Országos Gazdasági Tanács.«-
1 9 4 Order in Council No. 5610/1931. ME: »Országos Hitelügyi Tanács.«-
1 9 5 Orders in Council Nos. 8220/1948. Korm., 4109/1949. Korm. 
1 0 6 Acts Nos. 1885:IX, 1889:XXXIV, 1925:IX. 
107 Act No. 1926:XI.V. 
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the mediatory service of offices of the Hungarian Post has persisted also 
hereafter.108 
The Hungarian Bank of Investments109 grants investment credits and 
exercises the related control under supervision of the Minister of Finance and 
professional direction of the Central Planning Board. Its Centre is the 
Investment General Directorate of the Ministry of Finance having the sphere 
of action of a ministerial department. The organs of banking control supervise 
generally on the spot, according to the valid rules,110 the execution of 
orders corcerning money circulation, credit management, financial transaction 
of investments and state loans at every administrative organ, enterprise,, 
agricultural machine centre, institute, social organ with state assistance and 
co-operative having accounts at the Hungarian National Bank. - . 
Until most recent times also the different financial authorities functioned 
under the exclusive supervision of the Minister of Finance. In the beginning 
organs of first instance for taxes and duties were the town and village 
revenue offices, in Budapest the district tax accountancy departments.111 The 
royal revenue offices were, in the beginning, only treasuries but they turned, 
after World War I, into financial authorities of first instance.1'12 The royal 
district tax offices were, in the beginning, financial authorities of first 
instance,113 later, however, their task was transferred to the royal revenue 
offices and the district offices survived only in Budapest.114 The county 
financial directorates were organized in the counties to administer some tasks of 
the later royal district tax offices and in duty cases as appeal authorities,1'15 
and later generally as authorities of second instance.116 In other tax affairs:; 
mixed organs of municipalities and Chambers, resp. organs of the municipalities, 
(assessments appeal committes, fiscal committes - of the administrative com-
mission)117 were financial authorities of second instance. Authorities, of. 
third instance were partly the Minister of Finance, partly the Administrative 
High Court. The Office for Assessment of Duties118 managed the duty affairs-
in Budapest. After World War II the town and village revenue offices and 
district tax accountancy departments in Budapest were reorganized to state 
revenue offices and there were cretaed state revenue offices also is some villages; 
determined by the Minister of Finance. The former state revenue offices 
and purchase tax offices were unified and reorganized to district tax offices, 
108 Order in Council No. 1870/1949. Korm., Departmental Order of the Minister 
of Finance No. 10/1958. PM. 
1 0 9 Decision in Council Nos. 43/1948. Mt. h., 1084/1956. Mt. h.; Instructions of 
the Minister of Finance Nos. 81/1955. (PK. 27). PM. ut., 137/1955. (PK. 56). PM. ut., 
136/1958. (PK. 11). PM. ut.: »Magyar Beruházási Bánik.« 
n o Decree of legal force No. 29/1955. tvr. 
n i Act No. 1889:XXVIII: »Adóhivatal«, »Adószámviteli osztály«. 
J12 Act No. 1889.XXVIII, Art. 2/2a of Act No. 1924:IV: »Kir. adóhivatal«. 
n 3 Act No. 1876:XV: »Adófelügyelőség«. 
1 1 4 Art. 37 of Act No. 1889 :XXVIII; Departmental order of the Minister of 
Finance No. 24/1927. PM. 
1 1 5 Act No. 1889 :XXVIII: »Pénzügyigazgatóság.« 
1 1 6 Act No. 1923 :VII; Departmental orders of the Minister of Finance Nos. 
600/1927. PM; 12 000/1949. PM. 
n 7 »AdófeJszólamlási bizottság«, »Közigazgatási Bizottság Adóügyi Bizottsága«. 
118 Art. 37 of Act No. 1889:XXVIII; Order in Council No. 1500/1936. ME: 
»Illetékkiszabási Hivatal.« 
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with appeal to the county financial directorates.119 In Budapest the district 
tax offices and district tax accountancy departments were substituted by 
district revenue offices discharging also the duties related to the purchase 
taxes.120 
A Central Revenue Office121 was created in Budapest under immediate 
supervision of the Minister of Finance to impose and administer taxes of 
state and communal enterprises drawn into the single-account-sistem of 
encashment of the Hungarian National Bank.122 At first it administered all 
taxes and dues also of private enterprises drawn into the single-account-
system; the enterprises of foreign financial interest belong, however, at 
present to the financial department of the executive committee of the Council 
in the fifth district of the Capital. 
Customs organs were, for a long time, the customs offices, Central Board 
of Customs and the Minister of Finance.1213 Later the customs affairs were 
transferred to the competence of the Minister of Foreign Trade whose customs 
organs are the Central Headquarters of Customs Offices, a Customs 
Inspectorate in Budapest as organ of secondary instance, the customs offices, 
customs local agencies and the frontier customs posts.124 
After creation of local Councils125 the financial authorities have got from 
immediate supervision by the Minister of Finance under that of the Councils 
as Financial Departments of Executive Committees of the Councils,126 save 
the Central Revenue Office, the customs organs and the finance guards which 
liave not got under Council control.127 And the professional superintendence 
of the Minister of Finance has been maintained also for the Council special 
organs, according to the socialist principle of »double direction«. On the other 
hand, the county, district and town Councils and their executive committees 
systematically make also heads of other financial organs (Hungarian National 
Bank, Bank of Investments, National Savings Bank, State Insurance Office, 
etc.) on their territories render account of their affairs. They may, however, 
give no orders to them only they make their reflections known to their super-
vising organs.128 The competence of financial departments of the executive 
committees of local Councils is determined by ministerial orders.129 Recently 
the administration of village tax affairs has been returned from competence 
of district Councils, where they had been centralized for a time, to that of 
1 1 9 Order in Council No. 13 200/1948. Korm.; Departmental order of ,the Minister 
of Finance No. 15 800/1949. PM. 
120 Departmental order of the Minister of Finance No. 326 900/1948. PM: »Ke-
rületi Adóhivatal«. 
1 2 1 Order in Council No. 4186/1949. Korm.; Departmental order of the Minister 
of Finance No. 251 800/1949. PM: »Központi Adóhivatal«. 
1 2 2 So-called Single-Account Enterprises (»ÁESz-vállalatok«). 
1 2 3 »Vámhivatal«, »Központi Vámigazgatóság«. 
124 Decrees of legal force Nos. 24/1952. tvr., 16/1954. tvr., 7/1955. tvr.;. Depart-
mental instruction of t'he Minister of Foreign Trade No. 50/1956. (KK. É. 40). 
KKM. ut. 
125 Acts Nos. 1950:1, 1954 :X. 
126 Orders in Council Nos. 143/1950. MT, 24/1951. Mt. 
1 8 7 Art. 24 of Order in Council No. 143/1950. MT. 
1 2 8 Decision in Council No. 1070/1954. Mt. h. 
1 2 9 Departmental orders of the Minister of Finance Nos. 6300—2/1950. PM. 
6300—3/1950. PM, 6300—K/1950. PM, 11—50/1953. PM. 
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executive committees, resp. special administrative organs of village Councils, 
if it necessary, with contraction of more villages.1'30 
Also the systematic supervision of organs under Council control has been 
organized,131 as follows: a) The financial departments and other administrative 
organs of the executive committees of county (Capital, city) Councils are 
supervised by a reviser agency of the Ministry of Finance; b) those of the-
district (town) Councils by financial departments of the executive committees, 
of county (Capital, city) Councils; c) the administrative organization of the. 
executive committees of village Councils and the institutes and enterprises 
under their control by the financial departments of the executive committees 
of district Councils. In addition the special administrative organs of the 
executive committees of Councils exercise the systematic economic super-
vision of enterprises, associations, institutes, etc. being under their direction,, 
what does not concern the supervision also by competent Ministers. The 
controlling of co-operatives is a task of their directing authorities. The lower 
organs make accounts for the higher ones. The special administrative organs 
(in compliance with the principle of »double direction«) render accounts for 
both directing authorities. 
5 
Among the central control organs we bave to mention also the Attorney 
General of the Hungarian People's Republic and generally the attorney 
organization watching, in the sense of the Contitution,1'32 over observance 
of the socialist legality and proceeding in the course of their control activity 
independently from the organs of administration and from the local organs 
of state power (Councils).133 According to> the Act on the administrative 
procedure134 the protest of attorney may be applied also in the financial 
procedure. The administrative organ, has to examine this in eight days. If it 
considers it well-founded, it annuls or reverses its own order; if, however, it 
considers it unfounded, it presents the documents, in eight days, to its own 
superior authority for supervision. The latter makes provisions, concerning 
the merits of the cases, in further thirty days. 
2. Internal Organic Control 
The internal control endeavours to strengthen and complete the external 
control of organizations. Some try to confront these two types of control 
as formal and meritory supervision. This, however, is not right. The points 
of view of legal and economic controls may not be monopolized by either of 
these two methods. The external control is more suitable to the idea of 
supervision because the internal one is but a self-control. And there is no 
1 3 0 Decision in Council No. 1008/1957. Korm. h. 
1 3 1 Decree of legal force No. 29/1955. tvr. 
1 3 2 Art. 42—44 of Act No. 1949:XX. 
133 Decree of legal force No. 13/1953. tvr. 
1 3 4 Art. 61 of Act No. 1957 :IV. 
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organ which could be cosidered as unprejudiced- against itself. Thus the 
guarantees cannot exist in the case of internal control in the same measure 
and sense as in that of the external one. The internal control may, therefore, 
be appreciated but as a completion, in some cases substitution, of the 
external control if this, for some reasons, does not function. 
It is especially the decree about the reform of control of the administrative 
management,1" liquidating the audit offices, which has insisted on realizing 
such a reform of internal control of management of budget credits that met 
the requirements of the people's democratic administration and contained also 
important accountancy simplifications. It has separated' administration from 
management and management from its internal control, trying to substitute, 
on the field of accountancy, the superfluous and multifold recording system 
with a simple, lucidely arranged registration containing all essential data 
of management. During execution of this program budget departments were 
organized at each higher authority of administration and at a great number of 
other authorities. To lower authorities there were delegated special budget 
elercs. Their tasks have been assignation, audit of accounts, legalization, 
numerical revision, book-keeping taken over from the liquidated audit offices. 
A task of the central budget department of the Ministry is also the direction 
of the planned budget management of the whole department. 
The internal control of management and accountancy of budget credits 
is performed by audit departments, — organized in Ministries and at other 
administrative organs and subordinated immediately to the Minister or to the 
head of the organ, — resp. by their agencies (deputy clerks), and for want of 
these by the audit department of the superior organ. Their task is to control 
whether credit management of their authorities and of any administrative 
organs subordinated to them (budget department, section, referent) is motivated 
planned, profitable. and legal. They supervise the undertaking of obligations, 
assignments, management of property, financial and material managements, 
etc. They may, however, not impede the course of management. About their 
objections they inform the head of the managing organ. The competence of 
the late audit offices to control the credit management has been transferred 
to the audit departments and their competence related to non-budget credits 
to the competent special sections. 
According to another order136 the internal control belongs first of all to 
the heads of the administrative organs and enterprises. They have to supervise 
personally execution of important legal rules, orders or decisions. For other 
control they have to arrange audit sections (groups). To lower organs they 
delegate agents; these are instructed by the head of the organ. But the 
audit department of lower organs is not subordinated to that of the superior 
ones. 
Also the chief accountants (head book-keepers) have an important role 
in our present system of control. Their function has been organized at first 
in the enterprises, then, on the model of these, also in administrative organs 
with an important sphere of action. At public enterprises137 the head of 
book-keeping (chief accountant) is jointly liable with the head of the 
135 preamble, Decree of legal force No. 2/1950. tvr. 
136 Order in Council No. 75/1951. MT. 
137 Order in Council No. 2060/1949. Korm. 
CONTROL IN THE H U N G A R I A N FINANCIAL LAW 327--
enterprise (director, manager). He has to refuse implement of any illegal 
order, save after getting, in spite of his protestations, directions, in writing. 
But this he had to report to the competent Minister. The order contains 
also some personal guarantees decreeing that the chief accountant may be 
appointed, dismissed, moved, attached for special service, sent on leave, 
suspended only with previous consent of the competent Minister. 
The decree on state enterprises138 has reorganized the situation of chief 
accountants. It has reserved the rule that the chief accountant is personally 
responsible, together with the head of enterprise, for a legitimate financial 
management and for the order of administration of the enterprise. He is obliged, 
also henceforward, to report fulfilling of illegal orders, reserved in writing, 
not to the Minister, however, but to the directing organ. Guarantees of his 
appointment and dismissal have remained. According to a further order139 
he is a deputy of the enterprise director in the orbit of financial and 
credit management and of his control activity. He is appointed and dismissed 
by the same organ as the head of the enterprise. Against disciplinary 
punishment of the chief accountant the chief accountant of the immediately 
superior organ may make remarks to the chief accountant of the Ministry and 
this to the Minister. He gets a bonus or reward not from the enterprise but 
from the immediately supervising organ. These rules try to assure his 
disinterestedness and independence. His countersigning is necessary for a 
number of documents. He has to protest against dispositions of the director 
which are illegal or interfere with the interests of the enterprise. The dispo-
sitions confirmed in writing he 'has to put into effect, but. he has also to 
report this to the head of the next supervising organ. 
The institution of Ministry Chief Accountants140 has been patterned after 
the book-keepers of enterprises. Such organs function also in the ministerial 
departments qualified for direction of state enterprises or other economic 
organs. The Chief Accountant of the Ministry functions under direction of 
the Minister or his deputy for this purpose, and that of the department 
under that of the head of the department. The Chief Accountancies of economic 
Ministries function in the framework of the Ministries as their departments 
and those of the departments function in quality of sections of them. The 
competent Minister previously informs the Minister of Finance on transferring, 
suspension or dismissal of his Chief Accountant. The competence of the Chief 
Accountants contains, beside general control, performance of records, balances, 
account of results, supervision of wage fund management, superintendence 
and control of financial plans of enterprises. If the malpractice had not been 
repaired, the Chief Accountant of the department reports it to the Chief 
Accountant of the Ministry and to the Deputy Minister relied with immediate 
direction of the department; the Chief Accountant of the Ministry makes 
reports to the Minister, resp. to his Deputy relied with direction of the Chief 
Accountancy. 
Another order141 has prescribed for the heads of each directing organ to 
provide through their Chief Accountancies for at least one general local super-
is8 Decree of legal force No. 32/1950. tvr. 
1 3 9 Order in Council No. 125/1951. MT. 
140 Order in Council No. 124/1951. MT: »Minisztériumi főkönyvelők«. 
1 4 1 Departmental instruction of the Minister of Finance No. 181—1/1954. PM. 
ait. (PK. 8).. 
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vision a year at every budget organ, enterprise and co-operative under their 
supervision. This task, however, has proved to be unrealizable.1413 
A democratic idea manifests itself also in the endeavour to assure control, 
beside the special organs, also for representatives of the working people. 
This idea inspired the creation of factory committees.1*2 And later, after 
liquidation143 of the worker councils,144 also factory councils145 were organized, 
under direction of the Trade Unions, with a competence of supervision, report-
ing and ordering. The factory committees have to take care of their creation. 
B) Functional Administrative Control 
Another way of administrative control besides the organic control, which 
functions automatically, is a supervision, functioning not automatically, ear 
officio, from above or from inside, but on external impulse, generally on 
the initiative of private persons. This way of control can have two forms 
according to the subjects of initiative who can be either anybody or a closed 
circle of interested persons. The first possibility is the so-called »popularis 
actio«, the second the legal remedy. 
1. »-Populáris Actio« 
The popular action assures for everybody, whether he is immediately 
interested or not, a possibility to start a procedure of general interest by 
reporting the facts, necessary to initiate the procedure, to the competent 
authority. This action had been known also by the Roman law. E. g., everyman-
had a right to action in case of delicts against common property.146 And it 
appeared also on the scene of the modern criminal law though only as an 
exception.114,7 In recent times one applies it more and more and it has got 
a place, in different forms, also in administrative and financial laws. 
One of its forms in the present Hungarian law is the so-called book of 
complaints1*8 According to the order on this subject149 the criticism coming 
from below has an important role in revealing and eliminating the faults 
and so improving the works. Therefore it orders to establish complaint-
books in every bureau, office, plant, workshop, store of any organs, institutes 
or institutions of state power or administration, state organs, national enterprises 
or co-operatives which are closely related to the people at large,, save the 
military administration. The head of the organ 'has to observe the inscriptions 
" l a Cf.: Kiss 371. 
142 Departmental order of the Minister of Industry No. 50 000/1945. Ip. M.: 
»Üzemi bizottság«. 
1 4 3 Decree of legal force No. 63/1957. tvr. 
1 4 4 Decree of legal force No. .25/1956. tvr. 
145 Decision in Council No. 1086/1957. Korm. h.:. »Üzemi tanács«. 
1 4 6 Furtum publicum, peculatus, damnum iniuria datum. Cf.: Mommsen I, 184. 
1 4 7 In Hungary, e. g., Art. 135 of Act No. 187&:V; Art. 69, 85 of Act. 1930:111; 
Art. 12 of Order in Council No. 1400/1945. ME; Art. 8 of Act No. 1946:VII; 
Art. 6 of Act No. 1946:XIV; Art. 3/2 of Decree of legal force No. 12/1957. tvr. 
148 »Panaszkönyv«. 
149 Order in Council No. 194/1951. MT. 
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daily and make the appropriate actions. And even the authority exercising, 
the supervision has to inspect the complaint-books systematically and if 
necessary to intervene. 
Another way, in our present law, to general initiation is the information 
of common interest. 150 It appeared first in a decree15'1 reorganizing the National. 
Supervisory Centre. According to this decree there was a duty of honour 
of each citizen of the Hungarian People's Republic, following from the 
Constitution,152 to call attention of the Centre to faults, shortcomings or 
malpractices interfering with general interests, in organization or function of 
administrative organs or public enterprises. The Centre could initiate also mass, 
meetings to draw in as wide range of working people as possible. This idea, 
was expanded by Art. 5 of Act No. 1952:11 reorganizing the National Super-
visory Centre. This started also from the principle that the Centre in course., 
of its supervisions had to rely on data brought to its knowledge by the working: 
people and, therefore, performed its duties with participation of their circle-
as wide as possible. It has enacted again that there is a duty of honour 
of each citizen of the People's Republic to call attention of the Centre to faults, 
damaging public interest and even it has gone a step further, to employ 
more profitably the experiences of working people, organizing an Office for 
Notifications of General Interest.153 The Centre could charge with inquiry 
also the competent supervisory organ,. After liquidation of audit offices also> 
an order,154 reorganizing the internal control, denoted (without mentioning; 
expressly notifications) as a task of control of new type to ascertain mass, 
opinion. Act No. 1954:1, however, has spoken expressly about administration-
of people's notifications. According to this, heads of administrative organs,, 
of local organs of state power and of economic organs are personally responsible'.; 
for making a standing task for organs under their supervision to be aware, 
of notifications of the population and to provide for a systematic control in this, 
respect. On the basis of this Act there were organized some bureaux for 
popular notifications in Ministries and in county, district and town councils.. 
This Act decreed first that names of informants, if they wished or the interest 
of the affair demanded so, could not be revealed by the organs performing 
the inquiry.155 The personal protection of announcers is served also by the 
disposition that if prejudicial measures were taken against the informant,., 
because of his information, whether in his labour relations or in another-
connection, the organ of supervision had to re-establish the legal conditions, 
immediately and to care of his rehabilitation and indemnification. And-
then preparators of these measures were to be called to account disciplinarily 
and financially.156 And even the Act declares a felony any detrimental. 
150 »-Közérdekű bejelentés«. 
1 5 1 Art. 15—16 of Decree of legal force No. 17/1949. tvr. 
152 The Decree must .think here on Art. 59 of Act No. 1949:XX, according to* 
which it is a fundamental duty of each citizen of the Hungarian People's Republic-
to protect the estate of the people, to confirm the social property, to increase the-
economic capacity of the Hungrarian People's Republic, to raise the level of life-
of the working people, to increase their civilization and to enforce the order-
of the people's democracy. 
153 »Közérdekű Bejelentések Hivatala«. 
154 Art. 3 of Order in Council No. 75/1951. MT. 
1 5 5 Art. 8/1 of Act No. 1954:1. 
156 Art. 8/2 of Act No. 1954:1. 
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.measures against the informant.157 These provisions and also the Office for 
.Notifications of General Interest are maintained by the decree organizing a 
.Ministry out of the National Supervisory Centre.158 The decree on the annual 
systematic economic supervision of state organs and co-operatives159 also 
.accentuates that the control organs in course of executing their tasks of 
supervision have to rely on initiative of the working people and on data 
furnished by them. In any case, they 'have to control verity of these data. 
This problem is regulated again, with not many changes, by the Act on 
general rules of the administrative procedure.1*0 According to this Act every 
citizen is entitled and obliged to reveal the faults and shortcomings observed 
in any domains of state and economic life and to present a suggestion to 
eliminate these faults. It confirms the rule that the organ conducting the 
investigation may not reveal the person of informant if he insists on or if the 
interest of the affair desires so. It imposes, however, also restrictions on this 
anonymity by ordering to reveal, at request, the person of informant if his 
.information contains facts proved to be untrue which, if confirmed, would 
have given cause for a criminal or disciplinary procedure or they would 
have held the person or organ up to public obloquy. But there is room for 
revealing the person also in this case only if the head of the superior organ 
of the calumniated person or organ considers reasonable to take legal action 
against the informant. Also this Act orders about immediate annihilation of 
imeasures being disadvantageous to the informant, about an adequate rehabili-
tation and reparation for the offence and about calling to account the offenders. 
At last the Act organizing a people's control161 makes one of the tasks of 
supervision to struggle also, with help of facts brought to their knowledge 
by notifications of public interest, for revealing and eliminating the hostile, 
• corrupt and bureaucratic elements, prescribing personal protection, satisfaction 
and reparation for the informants again. 
2. Remedies 
According to our new Code of fiscal procedure,162 in fiscal affairs, 
including also the legal redresses, there are to be applied the general rules 
of administrative procedure and rules of the Code. The financial organ may 
order, in course of this procedure, evidence to be taken, interrogate partieSj 
witnesses, experts, hold an inspection, ordain auditing, etc. (special tax 
control), and may accomplish corrections, rectifications too (official remedies). 
Thus there are valid, also for financial remedies, the general rules of 
administrative procedure. We agree with J. Martonyi's interpretation163, 
according to whom the meaning of this disposition is that as the general 
rules of administrative procedure are equally valable in the range of all 
157 Art. 9 of Act No. 1954:1. 
1 5 8 Art. 20 of Decree of legal force No. 28/1955. tvr. 
1 5 9 Art. 10 of Decree of legal force No. 29/1955. tvr. 
1 6 0 Art. 67—8 of Act No. 1957:IV. 
161 Art. 3, 23 of Act No. 1957 :VII. 
1 6 2 Art 3—4 of Order in Council No. 57/1957. Korm.; Art. 6—10 of Enacting 
order No. 32/1957. (IX. 30). PM. 
163 Martonyi: Beszedési eljárás, 53. 
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special branches of administration, the special procedure Codes, as e. g. the 
fiscal one, may not depart from its principles but they can only complete 
them :n conformity with the specialities of their domains. 
According to the rules of the Act164 which are valable also in the 
financial procedure, there is, in principle, but one instance of appeal. This 
agrees with the system of appeal of the Act on Councils165 but it is not in 
harmony with a number of legal rules which assure remedies of more 
instances called generally revisions. Against the decision on the merits 
of a case of first instance anybody may appeal whose right is violated 
by it; against the decision of second instance there is, however, no more appeal. 
Appeals have generally a delatory effect. There is no appeal at all if 
an Act, decree or order (of Presidium, Government) excludes it or if the 
Government or a member of it was the first instance. Second instances are 
as follows: a) at Council organs against decisions of the executive committee 
or its President the superior executive committee, resp. the Government; 
against dicisions of the special administrative organs of executive committee 
or that of the President of the executive committee in special administrative 
questions the superior special administrative organ; b) at other organs against 
decisions of Ministries and central administrative organs the superior 
administrative organ, in last instance the Minister. 
The Act wants to help against rigidity of the appeal system of one 
instance assuring a right to lodge a complaint also if there is no more 
possibility of appeal. In my opinion this right results also from the 
Constitution of the People's Republic which guarantees the freedom of 
speech.166 If books of complaints had been established, and even the disinterested 
were entitled to lodge a complaint, it would be thoroughly illogical to exclude 
of this right exactly the interested themselves. J. Martonyi167 presses for giving 
a strict effect to the principle of remedies of a single instance and would 
exclude, therefore, any remedies granted in special legal rules. He may not 
think, however, on further restrictions of complaints. This would be in-
opportune not only for the reasons mentioned above but also because the 
second instance is, pursuant to the Act of procedure, often no central organ 
and so also the realization of unity of the legal order would encounter, in 
absence of special guarantees, difficulties. Besides, this is the only remedy 
in our positive law which is practicable also against omission or procrastination 
of deciding (silence de l'administration, déni de justice) as a remedy a priori. 
The development of the right of complaint has in this country also some 
antecedents of legal history. The Golden Bull168 had obliged the king as 
early as in the thirteenth century to give a hearing to requests and appeals 
of the royal servients and our diets often made use of this right of complaint 
(gravamen) to the kings against illegal measures. And later the municipalities 
(local government-boards) were allowed to lodge so-called complaints of 
guarantee169 to the Administrative High Court against some injurious 
164Art. 45—51 of Act No. 1957:IV. 
' 185 Art. 66/1 of Act No. 1954 :X. 
166 Art. 55/1 of Act No. 1949 :XX. 
167 Martonyi: Beszedési eljárás, 54—5; Lakosságadóztatási eljárás, 12—3. 
168 «-Aranybulla-« (1222, c. 1). 
1 6 9 Act No. 1907 :LX: »Garanciális panasz«. 
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Government orders which could be, if violation of law was found, annulled. 
One could turn also to the Head of State through a private secretary's office 
(corresponding to the Lord Chamberlain's Department), to the President of 
Republic through a people's office organized for this purpose (1949). To the 
Parliament private men could plead through a Member of Parliament,, 
municipalities and some bodies could write up immediately. There was always 
a right of complaint also to the Ministers. Against emission or postponement 
of deciding and against misuses of authority (excès de pouvoir) our law has 
not assured such a protection as the French law did partly by the help of 
the judicial practice (détournement de pouvoir).110 In this country there 
had never been an administrative jurisdiction of general competence like in 
France. It had been far back in the Past when King Ladislaus decreed to flog the 
judges who had temporized deciding.171 In case of denying competence the 
so-called negative clashing of authorities of courts and administrative organs 
enjoyed temporarily (1907—1948) a protection by a High Court of 
Competence,172 composed essentially of some members of the Supreme Court 
and Administrative High Court. At present this Court has ceased to exist,173 
and the ordinary Courts decide in their own competence their disputes with, 
administrative authorities concerning the competence. Their judgement is 
obligatory also for the latters.174 In our earlier law the jurisprudence assured 
the competence of the Administrative High Court at least in a special 
problem: against decision of administrative authorities refusing, resp. not 
prescribing to deliver certificates which they 'had to make according to a 
legal rule.175 
Rights of complaint and plea are definitely assured for citizens in the most, 
constitutions. E. g., everyman may turn freely, according to the Swiss 
Constitution,176 to public authorities of the Federation and Cantons (Peti-
tiönsrecht). These are obliged to accept the petitions addressed to them in 
writing if these remain, concerning form and content, in the framework of 
law, respect and morals, and fall within the competence of the authority; 
and even they are generally obliged to make possible also an oral audience 
if it does not trouble considerably the working process.177 The rights of 
complaint and plea are safeguarded also by nearly each people's democratic 
constitution178 and by some recent non-European constitutions.179 
According to our present Act on administrative procedure180 a complaint 
may be lodged against decisions and dispositions in the merits of administrative 
170 Cf.: Letourneur—Hamson 258—79. 
1 7 1 Si quis judicum distulerit litigia ultra triginta dies, vapuletur. III. 24. 
1 7 2 Acts Nos. 1907 :LXI, 1928:XLIII: »Hatásköri Bíróság«. 
173 Art. 11 of Act No. 1949:11. 
1 7 4 Art. 65 of Act No. 1954:11; Departmental order of the Minister of Justice 
No. 1/1954. (III. 26). IM. 
1 7 5 Art. 22 of Act No. 1896:XXVI; Decisions of the Court of Competence, Nos* 
1933. Hb. 47; 1940. Hb. 49, 58. 
176 BV. 1874, Art. 57. 
1 7 7 Ruck 66. 
1 7 8 Polish 1947, 1952, Art. 5, 73; Rumanian 1948, Art. 34; Bulgarian 1947, 
Art. 89; Albanian 1946, Art. 29; Czecho-Slovak 1948, Art. 23; DDR 1949, Art. 3/4; 
Jugoslav 1956, Art. 39; Chinese 1954, Art. 97; Mongolian 1940, Art. 96; Korean. 
1848, Art. 25. 
1 7 9 E. g., Egyptian 1956, Art, 62—3; Cambodian 1956, Art. 14. 
1 8 0 Art. 65—66 of Act No. 1957:1V. 
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affairs by anybody whose rights or legal interests have bein violated by them. 
The interested may lodge a complaint also if the administrative organ has 
neglected its duty to pass a decision or to make arrangements. The complaint 
will be judged by the higher authority if the organ which is guilty of 
default has not redressed the injury. In the matter of decisions and measures 
by administrative organs of the executive committees of county Councils the 
executive committee itself proceeds. Limits of right to complaint are as 
follows: There is no complaint against decisions which can be contested 
before a Court of Justice; in case of omission of appeal or during pendency 
of it; after one year from date of delivery of the decision; at last there is no room 
for repeated complaints. in the same affair in default of essential new facts. 
The Act on administrative procedure permits also protests by attorneys.181 
Therefore the interested may apply, instead of lodging a complaint, to the 
competent attorney for lodging a protest. This kind of remedies is particularly 
important, as John Beér182 has called attention to it, because our present law 
does not assure any judicial protection against decisions of local organs of state 
power (Councils); protests by attorneys are, however, allowed also against 
their decisions before the superior organs of state power.183 Thus besides 
possibility of lodging a complaint the only kind of the remedies for the 
interested in these cases is to turn to the attorney. 
All these are, however, but extraordinary kinds of remedies. The ordinary 
way of remedy in financial law is the appeal assured by financial legal rules. 
Its rules are not contained in the Code of financial procedure but they 
are decentralized in the several Acts and decrees and in other fiscal rules. 
E. g., against legality and rate of the imposed land tax one may appeal, 
depending on the organ of first instance, to the financial departments of 
the executive committees of district, county, resp. city Councils.184 Against 
decisions in cases of legality and rate of house-tax or of its remission one 
may appeal to financial departments of the executive committees of county 
Councils (instead of the late county financial directorates). If it is necessary 
to determine the ratable value of house property by local estimation or if it 
is demanded by the taxpayer, the financial department gives over the appeal 
to the committee of estimation to effectuate the procedure of estimate and 
the taxpayer may employ, at his own expense, also an expert called in to 
give a second opinion.185 The same is the procedure as regards legality and 
rate of contribution to housing repairs where the house possessor as well as 
the interested tenant may appeal, anyhow without delaying force.186 In the 
matter of general income tax one could, in the beginning, appeal to an 
assessments appeal committee, resp. to the county financial directorates, at 
present, however, one can appeal to the financial departments of the executive 
committees of County Councils,187 and lodge a complaint to the executive 
I " Art. 61 of Act 1957:IV. 
182 Beér 27. 
183 Art. 1 of Decree of legal force No. 13/1953. tvr. 
184 Art. 14 of Departmental order of the Minister of Finance No. 19/1957. PM. 
185 Art. 25—6 of Order in Council No. 8790/1946. ME; Art. 5 of Departmental 
order of the Minister of Finance No. 155 000/1946. PM. 
186 Art 12, 25 of Departmental order of the Minister of Finance No. 266 000/ 
1948. PM. 
187 Art. 39 of Order in Council No. 13 400/1948. Korm. 
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committees of county Councils.188 In matter of imposing, reducing and remissing; 
the general income tax of agricultural population one may appeal to the 
-financial organ immediately superior to the imposing council organ. About 
tax-relief the district Council may decide, however, only until up to a 'ctertain. 
maximum amount (Ft 1000). Taxes of higher amount must- be presented to 
decisions of financial departments of the executive committees of county 
Councils.189 Concerning the income tax of farmers' co-operatives one appeals 
to the financial departments cf the executive committees of county Councils.19,0 
Likewise in matter of the income tax of the producers' co-operatives.191 
Concerning purchase taxes of private persons there is an appeal of delaying; 
force to the financial departments of the executive committees of county 
Councils.192 As to purchase taxes of enterprises one can lodge appeal of. 
delaying force against decisions and measures of the Central Revenue Office193 
to the Ministry of Finance, against measures and decisions of financial 
departments of the executive committees of district (town) Councils to. 
financial departments of the executive committees of county (Capital, city). 
Councils.194 In customs affairs against decisions of customs offices there is. 
an appeal of one instance to a customs organ designated by the Minister of. 
Foreign Trade, and against decisions in first instance of the latter organ to; 
the Minister of Foreign Trade himself. Appeals against imposing customs 
duties have a delaying force only related to defraudation of the revenus.195 
The customs purchase tax is administered and levied contracted with customs 
duties. But this, in contrast to the customs duties, has remained under 
supervision of the Minister of Finance.196 In matters of dues (stamp duty, 
duty on conveyances, Court fees, death-duty, etc.) against legality and rate 
of imposed duties and penalties one may lodge an appeal of delaying force 
in further thirty days. Against decisions of financial departments of the. 
executive committees of county (Capital, city) Councils there is no more 
other remedy.197 Concerning legality and rate of the motor vehicles duties, 
there is allowed an appeal (instead of the late county financial directorate) to 
the financial department of the executive committee of the fifth district of. 
Budapest Council.198 
188 Art. 10 of Order in Council No. 90/1950. MT. 
189 Decree of legal force No. 35/1955. tvr.; Art. 19/1 of Decree of legal force: 
No. 20/1957. tvr.; Art. 59, 62 of Departmental order of the Minister of Finance-
No. 10/1957. PM. 
i9(> Art. 6 of Departmental order of the Minister of Finance No. 16/1952. PM.. 
191 Art. 19 of Departmental instruction of the Minister of Finance No. 93/1955.. 
(PK. 34). PM. ut. 
192 Departmental order of the Minister of Finance No. 21/1955. PM. 
193 Order in Council No. 4185/1949. Korm. 
1 9 4 Art. 36 of Departmental instruction of the Minister of Finance No. 25/1956.. 
(PK. 7). PM. ut. 
195 Art. 34 of Decree of legal force No. 16/1954. tvr.; Decree of legal force: 
No. 7/1955. tvr. 
1 9 6 Art. 1/2 of Decree of legal force No. 24/1952. tvr.; Departmental order of 
the Minister of Finance No. 3455—3/1952. (PK. 21). PM. 
197 Art. 92 of Departmental order of the Minister of Finance No. 6470— 
52/1850. PM. 
1 9 8 Art. 16 of Order in Council No. 4135/1949. Korm. 
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II. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
In the course of the development of our financial law a judicial, 
supervision has been realized in two forms: as administrative and as ordinary 
jurisdiction. The latter has been executed partly by Court's of common pleas,., 
partly by criminal Courts. 
A) Financial jurisdiction of the Administrative High Court 
As to the development and questions of principle of the administrative.' 
jurisdiction my opinion is exposed in my treatise »Democracy and jurisdiction, 
of public law«199 and in my address about a reform of the Administrative-
High Court in Hungary, delivered in the session of November 23rd 1946 of 
the administrative law department of the Association of Hungarian Jurists 
(Magyar Jogászegylet).200 I persist in professing also to-day that the most, 
effective way of legal protection is to assure remedies before the ordinary 
Courts of Justice and not to organize separate Courts. It would be particularly 
illogical just in a socialist State which does not privilege private interests, 
against the general ones and considers essentially every law to have a character 
of public law: To separate public and private laws so rigidly just in the field 
of judicial remedy bringing them before different kinds of instances in an. 
Age. when a great part of civil laws and the whole criminal law is considered 
to be of public-law character even in liberal legal theories. The practicability 
of uniform construction of the judicial organization, the requirement of the-
unity of law, the feasible simplification and rationalization of judicial 
procedure equally make desirable to exercise jurisdiction by a uniform 
organization. Thus also the problem of administrative jurisdiction in lower 
instances will be solved. 
Against protection of financial and generally of public laws by the 
ordinary Courts of Justice also counter-arguments can, of course, be advanced.. 
These are, however, unconvincing. As to the requirement of technicality, this-
can be guaranteed also within a uniform organization as well as by creating: 
separate Courts. If somebody is afraid of preponderance of civilists in. 
deciding financial disputes he would have logically to struggle also-
against criminal jurisdiction in the framework of ordinary courts because, 
also the criminal law is a kind of public law. And if somebody is concerned. 
for the prestige of State because.' of the judicial review, he ought to exclude,, 
consequently, every kind of remedies. Solomon Beck201 has rightly professed, 
in connection with recognition of preponderance of public interests (Noviczky),, 
that the assertion of this preponderance is the task of Acts and not that of. 
particular organs of execution. Also the arguments are not decisive which 
are anxious about effectivity of financial administration because of dilatoriness 
of jurisdiction. The fastest administration would be to exclude every remedy,., 
but it would be also the worst one. Creation of separate Courts is contrary-
also to the general democratic requirement according to which everybody,. 
, 1 9 9 Budapest (Ed. Hernádi), 1946:pp. XXXII+247. 
2 0 0 Szabó J.: Közigazgatási bíróság, 51—64. 
201 Beck 19—25. 
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in any case, equally can be called to account by the ordinary Courts of the 
country. By determining the tasks of people's control the Act202 emphasises 
particularly that this has to exercise its competence »without taking into 
consideration the persons and their positions.« The trend of evolution, therefore, 
points also in this country to recognition of competence of the ordinary Courts 
of Justice. This trend has been acknowledged, in our new law, by the Act on 
the administrative procedure.203 
This development is not contrary even to the principles of the ancient 
.Hungarian law. These always recognized the possibility of judicial review in 
•questions of public law with a contradictory (litigious) character. The tide 
turned only after 1849, but traces of competence of the ordinary Courts of 
.Justice in cases of public law could be found also after this time for a while. 
Thus the financial tribunals and high courts survived for a time and later 
merged in the ordinary Courts.204 The administrative jurisdiction in the 
framework of a separate court was realized in this country, following the 
-German example which was but a variant of the French solution, first only 
in tax and duty affairs. A Financial Administrative Court205 was created 
being a separate court of a single instance entitled to decide in merits of cases. 
Its members had the same rank like judges of the Court of Appeal in Buda-
pest but the Court decided in the last instance. Besides the system of a single 
.instance there was another fault that the Court had no general financial 
competence and could pass judgement only in direct tax and duty cases 
• enumerated exhaustively. 
Of this Court there was organized, as a next stage of development, an 
Administrative High Court.206 It enjoyed the same guarantees of judicial 
independence like the ordinary Courts of Justice and even more because its 
administration was not supervised by the Minister of Justice as that of 
ordinary Courts. But the faults of its predecessor remained. In contradiction 
to the original bill this was also organized with a single instance having as 
.a result such overburdening that the cases »ran« over, on the average, 
in three years. And the same fault resulted in such a bureaucratic swelling 
•of this judicial organization that it had at the end of World War II, in 
-contradiction, e. g., to the nine members of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, nine presiding and fifty-four other justices. The greatest fault was, 
however, that it took over the enumerative competence from its predecessor 
which could not be extended, according to the disastrous disposition of the 
Act,207 even by applying the principles of analógia iuris or legis. This 
fundamentally wrong rule — with which one made experiences elsewhere too, 
but which nowhere in the world has proved to be useful — was deteriorated 
.so much more by omitting from the enumeration the most important cases of 
202 Art. 3 of Act No. 1957:IV. 
2 0 3 Art. 55—9 of Act No. 1957 :IV. 
204 Art. 100 of Act No. 1868 :XXI; Art. 18/d of Act No. 1871:XXXI; Art. 1 of 
Act No. 1871: LXVI; General order of the Minister of Justice No. 646/1871. I. M. E.: 
Act No. 1872:XXXVIII; Art. 2 of Act No. 1873: XXXIX. Cf.: Szabó: Demokrácia, 
138—9. 
205 Acts Nos. 1883:XLIII, 1886: XI, 1889:XXVIII: »Pénzügyi Közigazgatási 
Bíróság«. 
206 Act No. 1896:XXVI: »Közigazgatási Bíróság«. 
207 Art. 19 of Act No. 1896: XXVI. 
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public law. This fault touched the tax and duty affairs the least but also in 
this domain occurred, as Oharles Martonffy208 shows, such an annoying 
exception as an Article of the Act on corporation tax209 which 
excluded judicial review not to speak about other financial lawsuits. This 
organizational fault, which paralyzed the effect of the Court despite of any 
merits of its members, was rendered possible by the fact that it was organized 
in the form of a separate Court and the possibility of administrative jurisdiction 
was not restituted to the general competence of the ordinary Courts of Justice. 
From the financial questions, mostly by the original dispositions of the 
Act, there came within the competence of the Administrative High Court 
cases as follows: the overwhelming majority of direct tax and duty cases, 
salaries of civil servants of State, municipalities and villages save; the 
soldiers' pay; pension cases of civil servants and soldiers; from the 
municipality cases chiefly the dogs' licences and from the village cases some 
surplustaxes and fees. Later the salary and pension cases of civil servants 
were, 'however, exempted from the jurisdiction and transferred to competence 
of the Minister of the Interior.210 On the other hand, the judicial review was 
extended also to the hospital fees and public reliefs. 
The Administrative High Court has been liquidated by our new law.211 
Instead of it in the midst of the Ministry of Finance there were organized a 
financial committee to decide in some tax cases, and a salary committe to decide 
in some salary and pension cases. There was organized also a committee for 
maintaining the unity of law. The right to complaint assured in other cases 
was abolished. The cause of liquidation of the Court was, according to the 
preamble to the bill, the opinion that »the People's democracy found the 
guarantee of civil rights in the state power exercised by the People itself. 
And the executive power is in the (hands of such authorities which keep 
in view in every respect the interest of the People. This being so there is 
no more need for a separate administrative justice.« Later, at the beginning 
of functioning of the county Councils and of the Budapest Capital Council,212 
also the committees replacing the Court were liquidated and the right of 
complaint assured until then in tax, salary, and pension cases ceased to exist.213 
The motivation was the remedy system of a single instance introduced by 
the first Act on Councils.214 
B) Financial jurisdiction of the ordinary 
Courts of Justice 
The ordinary Courts of Justice had had in Hungary, until introduction 
of administrative jurisdiction, a general competence also in financial lawsuits. 
There remained for us a particularly great number of judgements in cases of 
208 Martonffy 9. 
209 Art. 34 of Act No. 1940:VII. 
2 i° Act No. 1948 :LIV. 
2 1 1 Act No. 1949:11; Departmental order of the Minister of Finance No. 
57 500/1949. PM. . . 
212 June 15, 1950. 
2 1 3 Art. 1—2 of Decree of legal force No: 19/1950. tvr. 
214 Art. 53 of Act No. 1950:1. 
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customs and thirtieth parts.215 In the second half of the last century this 
jurisdiction became exceptional and continued its existence only in remnants 
bút in recent times it has come into prominence again. The criminal jurisdiction 
in financial affaire, however, has kept remaining in this country also in the 
times of the administrative jurisdiction. 
1. Financial Criminal Jurisdiction 
In our old law the so-called »inland revenue criminal law-«216 was 
regulated by a ministerial order217 issued with legal authorization,218 and 
having several amendments.219 Revenue contraventions220 were then any 
actions interfering with any legal rules concerning taxes or duties. The order 
used the terms »revenue« and »tax« in extending sense and would penalize 
generally any violation of financial measures.221 There were grave and petty 
revenue contraventions. The preliminary proceedings were conducted not by 
judicial but by financial authorities. In the course of this there were often 
shocking bargainings to buy the abandonment of proceedings. Only grave 
revenue contraventions got before Courts. They were tried by tribunals 
endowed with special competence of revenue affairs, as judges ordinary. Second 
and last instances were the courts of appeal.222 Tax frauds were crimes still 
more serious; they were tried by tribunals as financial criminal courts.223 
Customs revenue contraventions were regulated separately.224 
In our recent law after orders concerning financial crimes,225 financial 
contraventions and malpractices,226 comprehensive decrees and orders have 
regulated the financial and customs felonies and other breaks of law.228 Accord-
ing to these financial (customs) felonies are the acts as follows: a) any acts 
declared crimes by a tax rule, b) any acts declared tax frauds, curtailments of 
215 Cf.: Szabó: Demokrácia, 139. 
216 »Jövedéki büntetőjog«. 
217 Departmental order of the Minister of Finance No. 18 400/1928; Enacting 
instruction No. 45 400/1928. PM. ut. 
218 Art. 66 of Act No. 1927 :V. 
2 1 9 Departmental orders of the Minister of Finance Nos. 161 094/1945. PM; 
161 700/1945. PM; 162 000/1945. PM; 87 645/1946. PM; 87 088/1946. PM; 148 500/1946. 
PM; 163 200/1947. PM; 4657/1948. PM; 66 000/1948. PM. Orders in Council Nos. 
680/1948. Korm.; 9500/1948. Korm.; 11 520/1948. Korm. 
220 »Jövedéki kihágás«. 
221 Tomcsányi 465. 
22 2 Order in Council No. 990/1916. ME. 
223 Act No. 1920: XXXII. 
224 Orders in Council Nos. 4570/1948. Korm.; 7730/1948. Korm.; 4147/1949. 
Korm.; Departmental ordens of the Minister of Finance Nos. 206 842/1948. PM; 
98 800/1949. PM; 234 878/1949. PM; 102 010/1950. PM. 
2 i S Decree of legal force No. 47/1950. tvr.; Departmental order of the Minister 
of Finance No. 6620—230/1950. PM.: »Pénzügyi bűncselekmények«. 
226 Departmental orders of the Minister of Finance Nos. 6520—233/1950. PM; 
12/1952. PM: »Pénzügyi kihágások, szabálytalanságok«. 
227 Decrees of legal force NoNs. 3/1945. tvr.; 16/1945. tvr.; Departmental orders 
of the Minister of Finance Nos. 17—158/1954. PM—KüM. (together with the Mi-
nister of Foreign Trade); 10/1955. PM; 6/1956. PM. 
228 Cf.: »A hatályos anyagi büntetőjogi szabályok Hivatalos összeállítása« 
(Official Compilation of criminal law rules in force). Budapest, 1958. Chap. XVI, 
§ 308/ A—J.: »Pénzügyi, vámbűntettek, szabálysértések«. 
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tax, revenue contraventions, financial crimes (felonies or petty offences) if the 
tax amount curtailed or endangered by them, — resp., in the case of violation 
of customs rules, the inland market value of goods serving as their object — 
e x c e e d s a certain maximum (Ft 5000). Customs felony is committed by drawing 
away goods of the mentioned value from customs control, by giving untrue 
declaration about essential circumstances, by obtaining, concealing, alienating 
these goods or by taking part in these acts; in the case of reductions by using 
such goods in contrast to the conditions or by giving assistance to these 
acts. In all these cases the ordinary criminal law229 is to be applied with 
certain variances chiefly in view of confiscation and satisfaction. The procedure 
falls within the competence of the tribunals of district and may be initiated 
by the Minister of Finance, the competent Ministers, resp. the Attorney 
General of the People's Republic. The denunciation is to be omitted if the 
financial (customs) crime was committed by a worker of a state enterprise, 
institute or co-operation in his sphere of activity and no intentional sabotage, 
individual profiteering or gross negligence can be proved against him4 
Financial, resp. customs breaks of law are acts declared as such by legal rules 
and any violations of tax rules which are no financial felonies. An illegality, 
however, which is fined only with a percentile raising of the levied tax or 
with a super-tax, interest for default or defrayal of expenses, or is imposed 
exclusively with disciplinary penalty or fine for default, is no »-break of law« 
in the term of the decree. In the cases of the breaks of law there proceed; 
not the Courts but the ordinary financial authorities. 
And there are also other tax rules which decree about financial crimes and 
pettier breaks of law,23 "usually referring to the general rules mentioned 
above.231 Special legal rules decree about crimes against the people's 
economy.232 
2 2 9 Act No. 1950:11; Decree of legal force No. 39/1950. 
Off. Compil., Loc. cit., App. I., D., § 42—53. 
231 Thus in the case of house-tax: Art. 30 of Order in Council No. 8790/1946. 
ME; Art. 19 of Order in Council No. 750/1946. ME; general income tax: Art. 42—43 
of Order in Council No. 13 400/1948. Korm.; general income tax of agricultural 
population: Art. 21 of Decree of legal force No. 35/1955. tvr.; Decree of legal force 
No. 20/1957. tvr.; motor vehicles duty: Art. 3—4 of Act 1932:XXI, Art. 18 of Order 
in Council No. 4135/1949. Korm.; purchase tax of private persons: Art. 34 of Depart-
mental order of the Minister of Finance No. 1/1952. PM; wine purchase tax: Art. 
14 of Departmental order of the Minister of Finance No. 6453/1951. PM; Departmental 
order of the Minister of Finance No. 16/1955. PM; purchase tax of enterprises: Art. 
37 of Departmental instruction of the Minister of Finance No. 25/1955. (PK. 7) 
PM. ut.; income tax of producers' co-oparatives: Art. 16 of Order in Council 
No. 91/1951. MT; Art. 20 of Departmental instruction of the Minister of Finance 
No. 93/1955. (PK. 34) PM. ut.; Customs: Art. 1—5 of Order in Council No. 9/1954. 
MT; Decree of legal force No. 16/1954. tvr.; Art. 29 of Decree of legal force No, 
7/1955. tvr.; Art 28/1 of Departmental order of the Minister of Foreign Trade 
No. 1/1956. KKM; tobacco excise duty: Art. 10 of Order in Council No. 65/1951. MT; 
alcohol excise duty: Art. 4—7 of Order in Council No. 66/1951. MT; salt excise duty: 
Art. 7. of Act No. 1918:XIII; Order in Council No. 4820/1946. ME; dues: Art. 25—6 
of Act No. 1936 :IV; Art. 100 of Departmental order of the Minister of Finance No. 
6470—52/1950. PM; Art. 1 of Departmental Order of the Minister of Finance No. 
6470—63—1951. PM. 
2 3 2 Crimes against social property: Decree of legal force No. 24/1950. tvr.; 
crimes against the Plan: Decree of legal force No. 4/1950. tvr.; crimes against the 
discipline of labour: Act No. 1913 :XXI, Decrees of legal force Nos. 7/1951. tvr.,-
25/1953. tvr., Order in Council No. 28/1952. MT; evasion of fixed prises, crimes 
22* 
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2. Financial Civil Jurisdiction 
1. 
We have seen that by introducing the administrative jurisdiction to this 
country the financial competence of the ordinary civil Courts of Justice 
withered away gradually. And after liquidation of the administrative 
jurisdiction for a time there was no judicial review in these cases although 
such a review relating to administrative acts has never been contrary to the 
spirit of socialist law. Lenin himself gave directions in this respect in the places 
quoted above.233 Also John Beer234 has cited convincingly the letter to Bebel 
in which Engels, criticizing the Gotha Program, designated as a sine qua non 
of liberty that the civil servants could be called to account for their activities.238 
At last, following the example of the U. S. S. R. and of the most People's 
democratic States, which consider assurance of judicial review as one of 
the important guarantees of socialist legality, also our legislation started 
cn this way. The Act on general rules of the administrative procedure236 
rendered possible the judicial review again. It has made this, very rightly, not 
by organizing special courts but by permitting contestation of administrative 
decisions before the. ordinary Courts of Justice. The cause of ensuring 
judicial review has been, according to the preamble to the bill, the Govern-
ment's consideration that the judicial procedure, with the increased guarantees 
included in it, with unconditional enforcement of the bilateral hearing 
(audiatur et altera pars),231 »with making use of legal expertise and 
experiences, etc. gives so effective means of protection of civil rights and 
legal interests that it would not be practicable to renounce them even in 
certain administrative cases.« 
According to this law an Act, decree or order238 may allow that a 
decision of an administrative organ may be contested by action before a Court 
of Justice in the case of illegality. This cannot be considered a third instance 
of appeal; therefore the Court does not take over the task of the administ-
rative organ and its restrictions are connected with this. Such a restriction 
is, e. g., that the judicial review can be related exclusively to judgement of 
committal of an illegality and so the measures made in discretionary 
competence have remained excluded from jud;cial review. And the Court 
may not reverse the decision only annul or affirm it. It has, therefore, no 
reformatory but only cassatory competence, save in some cases of social 
against public supply: Order in Council No. 8800/1946. ME; crimes against the 
foreign exchange policy: Art. 37—66 of Decree of legal force No. 30/1950. tvr.; 
forgery, imitation of stamps: Art. 203, 206, 210 of Act No. 1878:V; Art. 55—58 
of Act No. 1879 :XL; Art. 39, 41—2 of Act No. 1908:XXXVI; Art. 2—5 of Act No. 
1932: XXI; Art. 3—6 of Act No. 1933 :XI; Order in Council No. 13/1953. MT. 
Cf.: Off. Compilation, Chap. X—XV (§ 229—301/A). 
2 3 3 Lenin, I. V.: Sotoh- (Works, in Russian) XXV, 317; XXVIII, 129. 
234 Beér 34—5. 
235 Marx—Engels 348. 
236 Art. 55—9 of Act No. 1957:IV; Enacting order No. 58/1957. tvr; Depart-
mental order of the Minister of justice No. 11/1957. IM. 
237 With which it is difficult to reconcile the legal exemption that the cases 
can be decided also without a hearing. 
238 Decreé óf legal force, Order in Council. 
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insurance, of registers of births, marriages and deaths and of lifting an 
embargo.239 And at last an action may be entered only if in the administrative 
procedure the appeal is excluded or the right of appealing was exhausted.240 
The restriction that the Act makes possible this remedy only against acts 
of administrative organs signifies that in our present positive law there is 
no judicial review not only against the decisions of the supreme organs but 
also against those of the local organs of state power (Councils). J. Beer241 
writes rightly about this solution that it. cannot be considered a comforting 
and definitive one. The decisions of these organs of state power can be 
supervised, on the basis of a complaint or of an attorney's protest, only by 
superior organs of state power.242 Also Beer's proposal to sever acts of power 
and those of administrative character within the activity of Councils (i. e. 
local organs of state power) and to permit judicial review against the latter 
kind of acts, on the model of acts of administrative organs, is right as well, 
and would mean essentially application of the method of negative enumeration. 
In the course of the procedure the action can be entered in a deadline 
of thirty days at the administrative organ which decided in the first instance 
or at the district court by the party concerned or by the attorney. The rules 
of the Code of civil procedure2'43 are to be applied with amendments of the 
enacting decree of the Act.244 Judgement of action falls within the competence 
of district (town) courts. Territorially there are authorized in Budapest 
exclusively the court of the fifth district, elsewhere the district (town) courts 
functioning on the residence of county Courts. The territorial competence is 
determined by the residence of the administrative organ which proceeds in 
the first instance.245 The validity of judgement (res iudicata) is ensured by 
two dispositions of the Act: In cases decided by a Court on the merits there 
is no room for a new procedure if the state of affairs has remained unchanged 
(ne- bis in idem); and the administrative organ is obliged by the judgement, 
therefore it has to proceed and pass a decision according to it.246 Appealing 
against a judgement, the attorney's protest for legality and recision of a 
judgement is not restricted by the Act. 
To bring the administrative disputes iri the competence of the courts of 
common pleas, instead of bringing them in that of special courts of questionable 
value or in that of an unquestionably wrong administrative (ministerial) 
jurisdiction (Ministre juge), is a right and progressive idea. This cannot be 
said about revival of the archaic method of exhaustive enumeration of 
content of judicial competence instead of ensuring a general competence. This 
method has worked well nowhere and never. Its revival can be explained as the 
hesitation of first steps. This Act is a bold initiative and it starts, just for 
this reason, on a way which had been closed in this country since a century 
and in several countries of the Continent since a century and a half, and on 
which in this part of the Continent the Soviet law of administrative procedure 
239 Art. 21 of Decree of legal force No. 39/1955. tvr.; Art. 57/3 of Act No. 1957 :IV. 
2 4 0 Art. 55 of Act No. 1957:IV. 
241 . Beer 27. 
242 Art. 1 of Decree of legal force No. 13/1953; Art. 64—66 of Act No. 1957:IV. 
2 4 3 Acts Nos. 1952:111, 1954:VI. 
2 4 4 Decree of legal force No. 58/1957. tvr. 
245 Art. 56 of Act No. 1957 :IV; Art. 5 of Decree of legal force No. 58/1957. tvr. 
246 Art. 59 of Act No. 1957:IV. 
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pushed first its way by the revolutionary introduction of the procedure of 
courts of common pleas and of attorney's protests.247 And the original fault 
of the method of enumeration is mitigated by making possible to extend the 
content of enumeration by Acts and even by decrees. The five points with 
which the Act 'has started248 are certainly established in an extremely narrow 
range, and only two of them concern the financial law. These are the decisions 
which decline to vacate assets attached in the course of administrative 
procedures; and the contestableness of the part of a decision, establishing tax 
and duty liabilities, which disposes of the legal ground of assessment. This 
restriction does not mean, however, that judicial review is allowed only in 
questions of law and not in questions of facts. The problem of the ground 
of tax and duty obligations is namely in general a question of facts.249 And 
the rigidity of enumeration is mitigated also by the provision250 that this Act 
does not concern the special dispositions which render possible to suit against 
some administrative decisions before Courts of Justice. This is true also for 
the disposition of this Act according to which at least an Order in Council will 
be necessary to permit judicial review in a case in the future. I. e., the judicial 
review will remain untouched also if it had been allowed by a ministerial 
order or instruction or by a Council injunction before this Act came into force. 
Also Ladislaus Névai251 and John Beér252 would not be averse to determine 
judicial competence in administrative affairs, de lege ferenda, with a general 
clause. They would except, however, procedure of the legislative body, that 
of the Presidium of the People's Republic and governmental acts of Gov-
ernment. Such a negative enumeration restricting the general competence is, 
in principle, right and applied also by other legal systems. The French 
Conseil d'Etat, e. g., may not judge over legislative and judicial acts by 
passing judgement on recours pour excès de pouvoir;203 the acts of Government 
(reason of State), however, cannot be taken off from it. It has judged, e. g., in 
cases of internment about legality of motives.254 Recently also some discretion-
ary cases255 which were excluded so far, has got into its competence, e. g., 
expulsion of foreigners or non-granting of passports.256 In the United States 
the acts of Government and the disretionary cases are excluded of judicial 
review.257 
247 Cf.: Szabó: Demokrácia, 110—2. 
248 Art. 57/la—e of Act No. 1957 :IV. 
249 Cf.: Beér 28. 
2 5 0 Art. 57/4 of Act No. 1957:IV. 
251 Névai 3—8. 
25 2 Beér 25—37. 
2 5 3 Ordonnance 31. XII. 1945. 
2 5 4 Ordonnance 4. X. 1944. 
255 Cas matériellement inexacts, cas d'ouverture. 
256 Cf.: Langrod: Council of State, 673, 687—692; Letourneur—Hamson 260. 
257 Langrod: Contrôle 235—6; Jaffe 775; Peck 55. 
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2. 
Among financial disputes, remitted to procedure of courts of common 
pleas by. special legal rules, cases of social insurance have an eminent 
significance. In these cases judicial review in this country was ensured very 
early. This is connected also with the fact that before the nationalization of 
enterprises and, in connection with this, insertion of expenses and incomes 
of social insurance into the state budget, this legal area was not a part of 
financial law but that of civil law. Thus the forces which hindered the 
development of jurisdiction in public law had no effect against it. The Act 
No. 1907: XIX on health and accident insurances of employees the 
between the insured persons and the sick-relief fund.258 According to the 
Act No. 1907: XIX on health and accident insurances of employees the 
authority in control of trade259 decided the disputes which arose partly 
between employees and employers as to sick-relief contributions and 
membership card dues, partly between the funds and employers as to 
compensation duties and insurance charges. But the party which was not 
satisfied with the decision of the authority could assert its claims before the 
ordinary Courts of Justice in fifteen days. For deciding the disputes between 
the insured and the fund, concerning sick-relief and accident damages, courts 
of arbitration were organized; their Presidents and their deputies were appointed 
by the Minister of Justice from judges for three years, and their assessors were 
elected »at par« by employees and employers. Appeal was allowed to the State 
Workmen's Insurance Office.260 Act No. 1921: XXXI on workmen's insurance 
jurisdiction brought these cases in the first instance before district courts 
on residences of the district workomen's insurance funds (workomen's insurance 
courts) and in Budapest it organized a special workmen's insurance court 
with a member of the Supreme Court as President. Court of appeal was the 
Workmen's Insurance High Court. Its President was the President of the 
Court of Appeal, its judges the judges of this Court. The assessors were elected^ 
at par from employee and employer members of the funds. In the High Court 
the assessors were appointed by the President from the elected.261 Act No. 
1932:IV on social insurance jurisdiction brought the jurisdiction in social 
insurance courts thoroughly within competence of the courts of common 
pleas. Henceforth in these cases the central district court at Budapest and 
the district courts authorized by the Minister of Justice proceeded and in 
second and last instance the Court of Appeal at Budapest. Assessors in the 
district courts participated only in enumerated cases. The social insurance 
relations were founded upon several Acts.262 In a few exceptional cases there 
proceeded immediately the Court of Appeal at Budapest, in others the Central 
District Court at Budapest with exclusive competence. In other social 
insurance processes, however, the general rules of civil action were in force 
concerning territorial competence of social insurance courts in the first 
instance. The Court of Appeal at Budapest passed decisions for unity of the 
258 Art. 76 of Act No. 1891 :XIV. 
2 5 9 Art. 176 of Act No. 1884:XVII. 
260 Art. 156—182 of Act No. 1907 :XIX: »Allami Munkasbiztosito Hivatal«. 
261 Art. 1—8, 17—19 of Act No. 1921:XXXI. 
262 Acts Nos. 1925:XXXIV, 1927:XXI, 1928 :XL. 
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law about questions of principle of social insurance which obliged each 
lower court.263 
Essential change was brought by a decree264 which incorporated, after 
nationalizations, the new social insurance from the area of civil law in that 
of financial law and entrusted it to the Trade Unions. Since then its central 
guiding organ has been the Trade Union Social Insurance Centre265 supervised 
by the Central Council of Hungarian Trade Unions,266 its local organs being its 
sub-centres and agencies. According to the enacting order of this Act267 
the procedure and organs of appeal in cases relating to health insurance 
provisions are determined by a Statute of the Central Council of Trade 
Unions. Against decisions of these organs there was no appeal more to the 
Courts. In that time there was no lawsuit also in disputes arising from social 
insurance relations between the Trade Union Social Insurance Centre and 
the public institutions having for subject social insurance contributions or 
claims for compensation.268 In pursuance of a recent decree,269 regulating the 
social insurance, the Trade Unions have continued proceeding in disputes 
between insured and insuring organs about insurance provisions. To enter an 
action to Courts of Justice against their decisions is, in general, not allowed. 
The statement of a medical referee committee supervising the inability to 
one's living is definitive. But the parties may exceptionally bring an action 
to the district court of residence of the insurance organ, namely: the insured 
in cases determined by the Government in which he was obliged to pay 
for damages caused by illegal enjoyment of health insurance provisions; 
the employer against the order for payment issued against him; both the 
employer and the insured against the decision relating to the existence of 
the 'health insurance relations.270 
The decree on the unified social insurance pension of workers and its 
amendment271 superseded the former rules on the obligatory old-age, 
accident, invalid, widowhood, orphanhood, miner's pension insurance and 
those on pension of civil servants, of State Railway and Post employees; it 
provided, however, for no remedies. Only the decree regulating this question 
again,272 charged the Government to determine the rules of proceeding and 
the organs being competent to hear the appeals. By reason of this authorization 
the order of execution273 at last regulated this important problem again but 
only concerning the claims for pensions asserted on the basis of the new 
legal rules. According to this, there is room for an appeal against the decision 
in the first instance of the sub-centre (agency) of the Trade Union Social 
263 Art. 2 - A , 9—11, 42 of Act No. 1932 :IV. 
264 Art. 1, 3 of Decree of legal force No. 36/1950. tvr. 
265 »Szakszervezeti Társadalombiztosítási Központ« = Sz. T. K. 
266 »Szakszervezetek Országos Tanácsa«. 
267 Art. 12/1 of Order in Council No. 238/1950. MT. 
268 Art. 1 of Departmental order of the Minister of Justice No. 2070/1950. IM. 
269 Decree of legal force No. 30/1955. tvr.; Enacting order No. 71/1955. MT. 
2'™ Art. 28—30 of Decree of legal force No. 39/1955. tvr.; Art. 108—9 of Order 
in Council No. 71/1955. MT. 
2 7 1 Art. 40 of Decree of legal force No. 30/1951. tvr.; Decree of legal force 
No. 8/1954. tvr. 
2 7 2 Art. 35 of Decree of legal force No. 28/1954. tvr.; Enacting order No. 
69/1954. MT. 
2 7 3 Art. 67—72 of Order in Council No. 65/1954. MT. 
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Insurance Centre and that of the National Pension Institute to the social 
insurance committee, competent according to the claimant's, domicile, in 
fifteen days. Against the decision in second instance the claimant may enter 
an action-to the domicile's district (town, fifth district of the Capital) court, 
in sixty days. But one may turn to the Court of Justice only in view of 
legality of the claim and the claim for compensation. There cannot bfe 
entered any action in the question of the numerical amount of pensions, 
of existence of infirmity or of functional disease; of degree of infirmity, 
resp. of. decline of working capacity; or against decisions deciding about 
pension claims based on legal rules which became invalid as this order had 
come into operation. In the case of claims based on an injury during 
employment, resp. on a functional disease there is a room for an action to 
the Court exclusively in the question whether there happened an injury 
during emloyment, resp. whether there is room for a compensation on the 
base of a functional disease. In the question what a decrease in working 
capacity has been caused, there is no action to a Court. In cases of mutual 
pension insurance of the members of farmer's co-operatives27 4 the claimant may 
bring an action against the committe's decision in the second instance to the 
district court functioning on the residence of the local sub-centre of the Trade 
Union Social Insurance Centre registering the claim for pension, and in Buda-
pest to the Centre District Court, in sixty days. But there is no lawsuit in the 
question of amount of pensions, of existence of infirmity, of measure of 
decrease of working capacity, of existence of a claim for bonus of nursing. 
A further important kind of cases in which, in connection with financial 
legal institutes, special legal rules have assured a civil lawsuit, is the so-called 
possessory suit in which one may enforce the property rights against movable 
properties sequestrated by a writ of execution.275 This action may be rendered 
in fifteen days, to the district (town) court of the place of attachment. If 
starting of this procedure was brought to the knowledge of the competent 
village tax group (finance guards) and verified, it has a delaying force on 
the execution. 
Also in cases of damages by expropriation the judicial review is 
ensured.276 
3. 
In legal systems in which the institution of administrative jurisdiction 
is unknown or exceptional, like in the ancient Roman and present Anglo-
Saxon laws, the judicial review of administrative acts is the general rule. 
In Rome the civil servants generally were subordinated to the ordinary 
tribunals, at least after expiration of their mandats. Th. Mommsen wrote that 
they did not know »the terrible institution of an exceptional political control 
27 4 Decree of legal force No. 65/1957. tvr.; Art. 48 of Order in Council No. 
21/1958. Korm. 
275 Art. 25 of Order in Council No. 57/1957. Korm.; Art. 76—78 of Depart-
mental order of the Minister of Finance No. 32/1957. PM. 
276 Decree of legal force No. 23/1955. tvr.; Order in Council No. 56/1955. MT. 
Cf.: Mrs. Ferrone 167—9. 
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body.«277 M. T. Cicero,218 however, regrets the absence of such a body and 
suggests to oblige each retiring magistrate to render account before the Censor 
about his functioning. But he considered the condemnatory sentence of 
the Censor only a proposal and the case fell, according to him, within the 
competence of the ordinary Quaestio procedure. In Rome there was only one 
magistrature irresponsible and thus free from any supervision concerning 
his actions: the Censor. His function was, namely, considered — like in later 
European laws that of the jurors — to be based excludingly on internal 
conviction, needing no legal motivation. 
The English legal theory deduces equality before law from the theorem 
of the rule of law. And from equality they deduce the general competence 
of the ordinary Courts.279 Therefore it is unimaginable, at least according 
to A. V. Dicey,280 to have in the English law such a notion like the 
French »droit administratif« of which also the German »Verwaltungs-
gerichte« have emerged later being transplanted also into the law of 
this country. For the term »droit administratif« the English language has 
had not even an equivalent. Its literal translation (administrative law) is 
unfamiliar and vague and only the most recent legal terminology has tried to 
give it a European interpretation. In the United States a judicial review of 
administrative acts came into being also by the writs of ordinary federal Courts 
of Justice. In recent times, however, there are signs showing that some 
administrative jurisdiction, a quasi-judicial review has developed also there.281 
Some cases remained excluded from judicial review by the practice of the 
Courts (inherently administrative decisions). Such are, e. g., the acts of 
Government (in political and foreign affairs) and the acts of discretionary 
competence which in liberal States, in contradiction to the socialist ones, do 
not enjoy, in general, a judicial review (actes d'opportunité). In the United 
States several disputes are considered belonging to this category in tax cases 
concerning questions of facts in which there proceed not the ordinary Courts 
of Justice but special Tax Courts have a quasi-judicial review.282 In the fourth 
decade of this century the judicial review by ordinary courts was generally in 
decline. Thus in New York the traditional remedies (certiorary, mandamus, 
prohibition)283 and later even the mandamus before federal Courts were 
suppressed.284 The Administrative Procedure Act (1946), however, restituted 
all the traditional writs. And the development of judicial review in the 
administrative cases is at present in progress again.285 This hesitation in 
277 Mommsen I, 698 : »Die allgemeine politische Befähigung der Römer hat 
sich in Betreff der magistratischen Verantwortlichkeit vor allem darin offenbart, 
dass sie im Allgemeinen den Beamten keine Ausnahmestellung, weder eine erschwer-
te, noch eine befreite gegeben haben.« 
278 Cicero, M. T.: De leg. 3, 20, 47. 
279 Cf.: Jaffe—Henderson 345. 
280 Dicey 191—2. 
281 A. P. A. = Federal Administrative Procedure Act, Public Law 404, 79th 
Congress, 60 Stat. 234. 2d Session, 11. 1946; 5 U. S. C. §. 1009 (1952): Administrative 
Courts. 
282 Langrod: Contrôle, 235—6. 
283 N. Y. Civ. Proc. Act, 1937, Art. 78. 
284 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1938, rule 81/b. 
285 Carrow 1. 
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recent American practice is exposed by L. L. Jaffe2m who has described that 
the judicial review there at the beginning of the New Deal seemed to become 
out of date but at present it is invigorated again. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OF FINANCIAL LAW 
The control on highest level is exercised in the area of financial law, as 
well as in the whole domain of public life, by the supreme organ of state 
power in the Hungarian People's Republic, the Parliament. It exercises 
every right derived from the people's sovereignty, determines organization, 
direction and conditions of Government. In this competence there are 
three points which immediately concern the field of financial law. These 
are legislation, determination and control of state budget and that of! thfe 
Plan of people's economy.2®7 
An act of control is, first of all, the right of Parliament to delegate from 
its members committees for researching any problems, if need arises. 
The authorities, offices and institutes as well as any citizens of the State 
are obliged to make available data for the parliamentary committees, resp. 
give evidence before them.288 As known, the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom has similar privileges which have served as models for the continental 
legislations.289 
Parliamentary supervision of Appropriation Accounts is by our 
Constitution of People's Republic not prescribed, in contrary to the 
Constitution of the U. S. S. R.290 and to those of the most People's 
Democracies.291 But both our old laws292 and recent decrees293 prescribe it. 
Our legislative body is, therefore, authorized to exercise also this kind of 
supervision. 
In this sense Decision No. 1 of the Parliament has ordered in 1956 
that the democratic principles of our Constitution must be used in greater 
extent than before to let the constructive activity of our working people 
develop. Therefore this decision has decreed that every fundamental question 
concerning the collectivity of the working people must be regulated by Acts, 
and the legal rules relating to fundamental duties and human rights of the 
citizens must be created in form of Acts (II/l). 'ihis means in the domain 
of financial law that Parliament wants to control the rules which prescribe 
both obligatory and unsolicited rates and taxes for citizens. This de lege 
jerenda (and even de lege lata) contains competence of Parliament to enact 
the rules of tax, to ratify international treaties and to determine and 
supervise the Appropriation Accounts. 
286 Jaffe 403. 
287 Art. 10/3a—e of Act No. 1949 :XX. 
288 Art. 17 of Act No. 1949 :XX. 
289 Dicey 54. 
2 9 0 1936, Art. 14. 
2 9 1 DDR 1949, Art. 122; Tcheco-Slovak 1948, Art. 62; Rumanian 1954, Art. 24f; 
Bulgarian 1947, Art. 17/7; Chinese 1954, Art. 27/10; Mongolian 1942, Art. 23, 79; etc. 
Exceptions are, besides the Hungarian Constitution (1949), the Albanian (1946), Viet-
namese (1946) and Korean (1948) ones. 
292 Art. 22 of Act No. 1870:XVIII; Art. 23—5 of Act No. 1880:LXVI. 
2 9 3 Art. 4 of Decree of legal force No. 26/1953. tvr.; Art. 1 of Decree of legal 
force No. 2/1956. tvr. 
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Parliament has prescribed in this decision, as a further directive, to enlarge 
the circle of its directing and supervisory activity; to put on its agenda the 
problems of national importance the arrangement of which is decisive for 
our economic, political and cultural life and development. Both Presidium of 
the People's Republic and Government have systematically to render account 
to Parliament. Thus there is made possible for the delegates of people to 
contribute, in the course of constructive deliberations, to determine the 
right directives for Government. A task of Parliament is, resulting from 
the Constitution — the Decision continues — to guarantee in the supreme 
instance conservation of socialist legality. The constitutional disposition 
according to which both President of the Supreme Court and the Attorney 
General have to render accounts about their activities to Parliament, at least 
once a year, must prevail. A special care must be brought to the requirements 
of socialist legality in the course of the supervision of administrative organs 
and at discussions of their accounts (II/2—4). 
These deliberations have taken place, since then, in due order. But 
Parliament has scheduled, over and above that, also amelioration of its working 
methods. It has ordered to convoke its sessions more often than before and 
to determine terms of its sessions so that due opportunity should occur to 
multilateral deliberation of reasonable tasiks, and for the representatives to 
make their motions, and exercise their right of interpellation. In points of 
agenda preliminary steps should be taken. For every bill a detailed written 
preamble should be prepared. And especially the work of committees of 
Parliament should be reorganized, their number should be increased and their 
activity also between the times of sessions must be made possible (III/l—3). 
For increasing the supervision the decision has demanded a closer connection 
between representatives and electors. It -has prescribed the making of accounts, 
to have consulting hours, to co-operate with state and social organs of working 
people to promote with all these the consolidation of socialist legality and 
state discipline (IV/1—4). And therefore, it has prescribed to define duly sphere 
of activity of Parliament and that of Presidium and Government ((V/l). 
Parliament needs, to perform this complicated control activity, assistance 
and succour of specialists. In the domain of financial law its most important 
assistant had been, in our old law, the Supreme State Court of Accounts.294 
This was an organ independent from Government and with an original 
competence. It was headed by a President of ministerial rank to be able to 
supervise the Ministries themselves. Its character was, in consequence of its 
competence of control and of independence of its members and above all 
of its President, functioning as individual organ, more judicial than 
ministerial, on the model of several similar foreign institutions.295 It supervised 
state expenses and incomes, administration of state estate and public debts 
and, in general, public accountancy. Incompatibility of its members was 
regulated strictly. Its President was appointed for life by the Head of State 
from three persons designated by Parliament on initiative of the House of 
Representatives. His impeachment could be ordered only by the House of 
2 9 4 Acts Nos. 1870: XVIII, 1880:LXVI, 1897:XX, 1907:XXIII, 1914:IV, XXIIÍ: 
»Legfőbb Állami Számvevőszék«. 
295 Cour des Comptes, Corte dei Conti, Tribunal de Cuentad, Rechnungshof. etc. 
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Representatives with general majority of votes and he could be convicted 
only in criminal proceedings of constitutional law established for Ministers.296 
The position of the President of our had been Court of Accounts paralleled 
essentially that of the British Comptroller and Auditor General. Also this is 
independent of Government and may not be member of any Houses. Also 
he is irremovable and can be dismissed only on proposition *of both Houses 
of Parliament.297 He presents his accounts through a Public Accounts 
Committee, delegated by the House of Commons, to the House. In Austrian 
law besides the Federal Court of Accounts298 also the member States (Länder) 
have their own Courts. These are assistants of Nationalrat, resp. of the 
Landrats just as independent of Government as our Court of Accounts was. 
In our law each Ministry was obliged to send the Court of Accounts 
its own accountants and the accountants of its subordinated organs monthly. 
And the Court was entitled to' supervise any other documents at any time. It 
could ask for informations and informed the Council of Ministers of its 
observations. About the results of its supervision it made a statement 
quarterly. Its most important task was to prepare the Appropriation 
Accounts. It presented this with observations of the Prime Minister and with 
relating decisions of the Council of Ministers to Parliament without delay. 
Together with this it presented to Parliament the balance of state estate 
with, its report and with observations of the Council of Ministers. The 
Act299 prescribed also the detailed content of Appropriation Accounts which 
had to contain the following points: 1st, a synoptic statement of possible 
unestimated costs arranged in the system of the Appropriation Act, under the 
correspondent heads and chapters; 2nd, the statement of transit items under 
chapters of extraneous moneys, granted and contracted loans, supplies, 
appropriation funds, conversions; 3rd, state inventory under chapters of 
real estate, products, materials, tools and means, surplus stocks, national 
debts and claims, active and passive arrears; 4th, a balance under chapters 
cash, income, and estate balances; 5th, details for enlightening' the parts 
1—3 of Appropriátion Accounts. The Act prescribed also the content of the 
synoptic statement. On accounts of detailed items the result of administration 
was to be demonstrated from item to item. The Court presented to Parliament 
in its annual detailed report the motivation of Ministers about the 
unfavourable differences between expenses and incomes prescribed in the 
Appropriation and Finance Acts and the actual remittances, with observations 
of the Court itself. Detailed prescriptions regulated supervision of funded 
and unfunded debts and of mintage especially for impeding that these overstep 
the legally prescribed accounts. The competence of the Court was later 
extended also to supervision of the Postal Savings Bank.300 The Ministers were 
authorized to issue their orders and instructions concerning management of 
a«« Art. 34 of Act No. 1848:111. 
297 Dicey 290—5; The Exchequer and Audit Department's Act, 1866, 29 & 30 Vict, 
c. 29, sec. 3. 
298 Rechnungshof: Art. 121—8 B—VG., Rechnungshofgesetz v. 12. VI. 1948. 
BGBl. 144; Art. 5—6. VEG (1925), Vdg. BGBl. 161. v. 1926. Cf.: Melichar 176 ff., 
Adamovich 356—62. Also in Switzerland, in Canton Zurich, the role of a similar 
organ (Staatsrechnungsprüfungskommission) is recently increasing; cf.: Schaumann 7. 
2 9 9 Art. 25—7 of Act No. 1880.LXVI. 
3 9 0 Art. 30 of Act No. 1885 :IX. 
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money and estate, accountancy and supervision only wi th preliminary consent 
of the President of the Court of Accounts.3 0 1 
Our n e w law has l iquidated t h e Court.302 The n e w organs which have 
taken over the control tasks are not parliamentary^ organs co-ordinated to 
Government, but organs of Government. Therefore w e have treated their 
status not here but wi th in the framework of the administrative control. 
From point of v i ew of constitutional law chiefly their control task relating 
to Appropriation Accounts is important. These tasks are concisely determined, 
in the legal rules relating to them. 3 0 3 Being, however, organs of Government, 
they prepare their reports for this and not immediately for Parliament. 
Therefore also this function of t h e m falls within the framework of ad-
ministrative supervision. 
Др. Йожеф Сабо 
Профессор университета 
ФОРМИРОВАНИЕ КОНТРОЛЬНОЙ СИСТЕМЫ ВЕНГЕРСКОГО 
ФИНАНСОВОГО ПРАВА 
(Резюме) 
Контроль является государственно-административным, судебным и конституцион-
но-правовым. Государственно-административный контроль является органическим 
(внешним и внутренним) и функциональным. Децентрализованными органами внеш-
него органического контроля в течение долгого времени надяду с органами, веду-
щими хозяйство, были счетоводства (закон XX 1897 года); Подчинены не контро-
лируемому ими ограну, а спецминистерству, более того позднее только министру 
финансов (закон XXVIIII 1920 года); но при реорганизации учета были ликвудированы 
(указ 2/1950). Центральным внешним контрольным органом стала Центральная 
комиссия народного контроля (закон VII 1957 года), которая вступила вместо вре-
менно существовавшего Управления государственного контроля (1948), а затем Ми-
нистерства государственного контроля (1955). Имеются также и местные ограны и 
весь орган работает под руководством правительства. Но в контроле участвуют также 
и другие центральные органы государства, в особенности Президиум ВНР, прави-
тельство и в первую очередь Министр Финансов вместе с подчиненными ему бан-
ками и финансовыми органами. Местными органами финансового контроля сегодня 
являются финотделы исполнительных комитетов местных советов, вступившие вместо 
бывших финансовых управлений, налоговых инспектов, налоговых управлений и 
управлений по начислению сборов. В противоположность этому в рамках местных 
советов еще и сегодня не находится Центральное налоговое управление для выпол-
нения учета общественных задолженностей государственных предприятий. Оно и 
фининспекция работают под надзором министра финансов, а таможенные органы под 
руководством министра внешней торговли. Финансовый контроль осуществляет также 
Государственная прокуратура (§ 61 закона IV 1957 года). И все в большей мере 
развертываются также органы внутреннего контроля: бюджетные и контрольные 
органы ведомств и предприятий (указ 2/1950) и контрольная деятельность началь-
ников, директоров и главных бухгалтеров. Функциональный государственно-адми-
нистративный контроль состоит в предоставляемом всем народном контроле (книги 
жалоб, заявления, преследующие охрану общественных интересов, подаваемые в 
30! Art. 142/1 of Act 1897 :ХХ. 
3 0 2 Art. 24 of Decree of legal force No. 17/1949. tvr. 
3°3 Art. 21 of Decree of legal force No. 17/1949. tvr.; Art. 2 of Act No. 1952:11; 
Art. 3 of Decree of legal force No. 28/1955. tvr.; Art. 3 of Order in Council No. 
6/1958. Korm. 
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органы народного контроля: § 3—23 закона VII 1957 года); отчасти в обычных 
жалобах (закон IV 1957 года и постановление правительства 57/1957). 
Судебный контроль по линии финансового права в течение долгого времени осу-
ществлял организованный по образцу фервальтугсгерихтов, в первой инстанции, имев-
шей узкую компетенцию Верховный Суд по делам, связанным с государственным 
управлением (закон XXVI 1896 года). (Детали см. И. Сабо) «Демократия и госу-
дарственно-правовое судопроизводство». Будапешт, 1946). После его ликвидации 
(закон II 1949 года) временно работали административные арбитражи. Обычные 
суды в течение долгого времени имели компетенцию только по финансовым и тамо-
женным преступлениям (постановление министра финансов 18.400/1928). Они были 
демократизированных новыми правилами (указы 3/1954, 16/1954). Гражданские суды 
в старом праве до 1948 года разбирали также отдельные финансово-правовые споры. 
Сегодня в отдельных перечисленных налоговых делах § 55—9 закона IV 1957 года 
снова дают им компетенцию. Судебный контроль над правовыми спорами по общест-
венному страхованию после многих старых законов (закон XIV 1801 года и закон IV 
1932 года и т. д.) обеспечивается также новыми постановлениями (постановление Со-
вета Министров 65/1954, указы 39/1955, 65/1957). 
Конституционно-правовой контроль осуществляется Государственным собранием. 
Он же осуществляет контроль итоговых расчетов, но не на основании Конституции 
Народной Республики (закон XX 1949 года), а на основании старых законов и 
новых постановлений (указы 26/1953, 2/1956). Вспомогательным органом парла-
ментского контроля в течение долгого времени был независимый от правительства 
Верховный государственный финансовый контроль (закон XVIII 1870 года), с ком-
петенцией подобной австрийскому Рехнунгсгофу и французскому Кур де Компт. 
После ликвидации (указ 17/1949) на его место вступили известные административ-
органы контроля. 
